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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 



























































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers
fvîo I
Power and Plenty?
From the Internal Market to Political 
and Security Cooperation in Europe
Christoph Bertram 
Sir Julian Bullard 
Lord Cockfield 
Sir David Han nay 
Michael Palmer
1991





























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the authors.
© Bertram et al.
Printed in Italy in April 1991 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































European Union: Forward from the Internal 
Market Programme and “1992"
Lord C ockfield......................................................................................p. 7
The 1992 Challenge: The External Discussion
Sir David H annay .................................................................................. p. 19
European Political Cooperation 1970-1990:
A Tale o f two Decades
Sir Julian B u lla rd ...................................................................................p. 31
An East-West Institutional Framework
Michael P a lm er ..............................................................................p. 45
The Past as Future: Towards a European Defense Community 
Christoph B ertram ................................................................................. p. 59






















































































































































































Forward from the Internal Market 
Programme and “1992”
LORD COCKFIELD
A Turning Point in History
There are turning points in history; frequently only dimly perceived at 
the time but later clearly identified. The renaissance of the Community 
which was launched by the Internal Market Programme and in its wake 
the Single European Act is likely to prove such a turning point.
The roots of change often go back a very long way. Nevertheless, a 
point is reached when the process of change suddenly seems to take off. 
Thus, when the British Prime Minister quotes Magna Carta as having 
preceded the Declaration of the Rights of Man by several centuries she is 
entirely right: but this does not alter the fact that the French Revolution 
changed the world in a way Runnymede never did.
The Birth of the Concept of European Union
Over the centuries, repeated attempts were made to unify Europe by 
force — the Romans, Charlemagne, Napoleon and in our own day Hitler. 
They all ultimately failed. What distinguishes the present move to 
European Union is that it is based on free and voluntary agreement not 
undertaken in war or under the duress of war. In that it is not unique — 
the federations in both Canada and Australia were also the product of 
voluntary agreement although in those cases the circumstances were much 
easier as there was not, except to a limited extent, the same history of 
conflict between the participants.
The concept of European Union was firmly embedded in the founding 
treaties, the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome. But after a vigorous 
and successful start the Community ran into serious difficulties. First with 
de Gaulle, reflecting his intensely nationalistic approach, and then more 



























































































and the enlargement of the Community to include new Member States 
who — events were to show — did not all entirely share the visions of the 
founders of the Community.
The Internal Market Programme and the Single 
European Act
But as Europe gradually recovered from the recession, the original vision 
of a united Europe began to emerge once again. In 1983 the solemn dec­
laration on European Union was subscribed to at Stuttgart by the Heads of 
Government and the Foreign Ministers of all the Member States. At this 
stage sceptics could still claim, in the way that some countries still try to 
dismiss what they do not like, that this was mere rhetoric. But in June 
1985 we produced the White Paper on the completion of the Internal 
Market. This was endorsed by the Heads of Government when they met at 
Milan the same month. And within a matter of months this in turn was 
followed by the negotiation of the Single European Act at Luxembourg in 
December 1985.
The Single Act both gave legislative backing to the Internal Market 
Programme in the clearest and most specific terms and it enacted substan­
tial improvements in procedures to ensure that the goal was achieved. But 
the Single Act did more than this. It provided also for the implementation 
of many of the policies set out in the solemn declaration. From time to 
time we need to remind ourselves of just what a tremendous canvas was 
painted by the Single Act:
The Internal Market 
Social policy
Economic and monetary union 
Economic and social cohesion 
Science and technology 
The environment: and
Political co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy.
So suddenly we had passed from rhetoric to action. The vision was no 
longer just a vision: it was a vision in action. This is why these events of 
1985 were, and will prove to be, a turning point in history. Interestingly, 
the date likely to be associated with these dramatic events is likely not to 
be 1985 but 1992, the date set for the completion of the Internal Market 
Programme and which is now part not only of the history of the Com­




























































































From the Internal Market Programme to 
European Union
The seminal importance of the Internal Market Programme is that it 
initiated a process of change. It has demonstrated that the will is master of 
events and that if the will is there the events can be moulded in the form 
we want. It started a whole process of change; and when the Heads of 
Government at Hanover in June of last year declared that the process was 
“irreversible” they were setting their seal of approval on far more than 
the Internal Market Programme. And so events are unfolding themselves. 
Monetary union we will have in matter of a few years; and economic 
union will follow. We need have no doubt now that we will see European 
Union in both the economic and political sense. And it will be achieved 
within the lifetime of many alive today. The time when one could stop it 
has passed. The turning point was marked perhaps by the British Prime 
Minister’s Bruges speech: a speech which was designed to attack the whole 
concept of European Union ended up by calling forth the forces support­
ing European Union, uniting them and giving them fresh determination. 
If you toll the bell, beware, it may toll for thee.
The Issues we now Face
So the questions we now have to ask ourselves are these:
What will be the shape of this economic and political union?
Who will participate in it?
What will be its implications for the world outside the Community 
both in political and economic terms?
The great merit of the establishment of the Jean Monnet Chair in the Eu­
ropean University Institute is that it provides a forum at which these is­
sues can be debated: in which ideas can be tossed into the arena and 
progress made in the cut and thrust of debate. On the present occasion I 
can do no more than suggest the lines our future consideration should take 
and leave it to subsequent discussion and study to flesh out the ideas, to 
develop them, to endorse or even to reject then.
But the bed-rock on which we stand is this. In the 1992 programme, 
and in the Single Act, we have started a process that will not, and cannot, 
be stopped. Our task is to mould that process to the greater benefit of the 




























































































The Future Structure of Europe
In a number of speeches I have delivered in the last year or so, particu­
larly in the address I gave at the Swiss Institute of International Affairs in 
Zurich in October of last year and in the “Mobil” lecture I delivered at 
the London School of Economics in June of this year, I set out the way 
that I thought the Community would develop in the years ahead. I do not 
propose repeating the arguments I then deployed: but the broad conclu­
sions I then came to, I adhere to. Indeed, subsequent events have moved in 
a direction consistent with, not opposed to, the analysis I had set out.
No longer can we simply look at the Community in isolation. Not only 
are other countries applying, or contemplating applying for membership, 
but the relationship with the EFTA countries is developing more vigor­
ously than at any time since the Luxembourg declaration of 1984 set out 
the concept of the “European economic space”. Of critical importance 
also is that we are now seeing the gradual demise of the Russian empire. 
Nothing like that has occurred since the decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire a thousand years or more ago. This is leaving a vacuum in Eu­
rope which must be filled, and it must be filled, I suggest, by Europe. It 
has another important consequence, namely that the prospect of military 
conflict which dominated the policies of the super powers for so many 
years is fading. As it fades the economic dimension becomes more and 
more important. It is therefore the European Community with its roots 
firmly bedded in economic union which needs to play the lead role in 
these future developments. I return to these matters later in this address.
So it is the future structure of Europe as a whole we are now compelled 
to look at: the way the Community strictly defined will develop; and what 
will be the relationships between that Community and the structure which 
will emerge in the greater Europe. The position is greatly complicated by 
the fact that the Community itself is in a process of rapid development. 
There is no doubt that that development will go ahead and succeed: but 
there is serious doubt whether all the members of the Community will go 
along with those developments.
In the previous lectures to which I have referred, I identified four po­
tential groupings. First, what one might describe as an inner circle of 
those members of the Community who would progress to full economic 
and political union. Second, a group of countries — some present mem­
bers of the Community but possibly some others as well — who would 
accept economic but not political union. Third, a group — again possibly 
including some present members of the Community but mainly countries 
at present outside the Community — who would accept something like the 
1992 programme but no more. And finally an outer circle comprising a 
free trade area but no more.
At first sight such a pattern would appear to be excessively complex. 
But in fact it is no more complex than the situation which exists at pre­




























































































munity; with many countries with varying association agreements with the 
Community; and the Community itself divided by special arrangements 
and derogations to meet the difficulties or prejudices of particular Mem­
ber States. Indeed, it could well be regarded as a rationalisation of a sit­
uation which in fact already exists.
Nevertheless, my own view is that countries would tend to gravitate to­
wards one end of the spectrum or the other. There are strong practical — 
let alone political — reasons making this likely to happen. The institu­
tional problems of getting a four tier structure to operate, and even more 
so to develop, are likely to push strongly in this direction. We can already 
see these forces at work in the Community/EFTA relationship where — 
even with what still remains essentially a free trade relationship — there 
is acute dissatisfaction on the part of the EFTA countries at their exclu­
sion from the decision-making process and a determination on the part of 
the Community that its autonomy in decision-making should not be put at 
risk by the Comm unity/EFT A relationship. The fact that final agreement 
on the convention on non life insurance between the Community and 
Switzerland was held up for so long reflected fears on both sides that 
their future independence in decision-making was put at risk.
The issues involved are interrelated and interdependent. The number of 
groups, or tiers, will depend on how flexible the countries comprising 
them are: and this in turn depends on who those countries are. Some 
countries regard the common good of the Community as the overriding 
objective. Others are determined to defend their undiluted national 
sovereignty to the last gasp. Countries with a tradition of neutrality may 
not find this easily reconciled with the growing competence of the Com­
munity. And the more we extend our ambitions to cover the wider Eu­
rope, the greater the problem of finding an acceptable accord between 
different political philosophies.
One cannot carry this sort of discussion very far before it becomes nec­
essary to talk in terms of the likely outlook and political stance of indi­
vidual countries. Here one is beginning to tread on delicate ground. It is 
all too easy to upset the political sensitivities of particular countries. Nor 
is the position made any easier by the fact that statements or declarations 
by the governments of individual countries often need to be taken with a 
pinch of salt. A declaration of intent to die in the last ditch may be no 
more than a cover for retreat: and a rigid and intransigent stance may be 
essentially a bargaining ploy. Nor must we entirely discount the fact that 
governments, like individuals, do sometimes leam from experience: and 
they may at the last moment come to the conclusion that it is better not to 
jump into the abyss after all. So far as we are concerned, therefore, we 
have to divine what is likely to happen under the pressure of events; not 
even what we ourselves would want to happen or others would express a 
determination to ensure should not happen: but what we believe at the end 





























































































I believe — and certainly in Europe this view is widespread — that polit­
ical union will come. I believe equally that it is a mistake to talk in terms 
of a “United States of Europe” as this suggests that we should — or would
— follow the American pattern. Not only do I believe this unlikely — 
essentially on the ground that the United States gives far more power to 
the federal authority than is likely to be necessary or acceptable in Europe
— but because the comparison is likely to arouse unnecessary and ill in­
formed oppositions. I will return to the question of the powers and insti­
tutions of a political union in a moment but at this stage I would empha­
sise that both the extent of the powers and the nature of the institutions 
are as of now completely open questions. With these reservations clearly 
in mind I would suggest that the kernel of political union lies in the close 
and growing co-operation between France and Germany — the Franco- 
German axis as it is sometimes called. This is not new. In the past it has 
waxed and waned but in recent years, particularly under the leadership of 
President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, it has become the dominant 
force in the Community — strengthened I regret to say by the withdrawal 
of my own country to the sidelines of European development. Once 
France and Germany moved decisively towards political union they would 
be likely — not least for economic and strategic reasons — to carry the 
Benelux countries — Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg — with them. 
Nor would Italy with its firm commitment to the European ideal be left 
behind. So we would see at long last emerging the objective the Treaty of 
Rome originally looked ahead to; and embracing, understandably, the 
original, founder members of the Community. Once this development was 
underway, one would expect both Ireland and Spain, who have both 
shown a strong European commitment, to join in. And possibly Portugal 
too. Of the present Community this would leave out only the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Greece. However much I regret having to say so, 
I see no reasonable prospect of the first two being prepared to take such a 
historic step forward: and on Greece I can express no opinion.
The European Union
Interestingly, what has emerged from this brief survey corresponds very 
closely to the pattern which emerged when the decision was taken in 1985 
to set up the inter governmental conference at Luxembourg. The real 
significance is that what happened then and what has happened since — 
and is likely to be repeated when the time comes to decide on the inter 
governmental conference on economic and monetary union — establishes 
very clearly the position that when the chips are down the great majority 
of Member States will go along with the ultimate development of the 




























































































this full political and economic union quite simply “the European Union” 
thus reflecting the terminology of the solemn declaration; and that we 
eschew descriptions such as “the United States of Europe”.
Those who choose not to go along will simply be left behind. President 
Mitterrand in a recent speech made precisely this point. There is now no 
question of a minority preventing the majority going forward. Something 
else follows from this analysis. The “minority” is likely to be too small 
and too lacking in cohesion to form a viable group. Consequently, a “two- 
speed Europe” in the sense hitherto understood is neither a serious threat 
nor a serious possibility. This I regard as a point of major importance.
The Greater Europe
Given therefore that we have in “the European Union” a tightly knit and 
cohesive Community, even if somewhat smaller than at present, what we 
now have to consider is what will be the structure of the greater Europe 
— East and West — as we move towards and into the 21st century: and 
what will be the relationship between the European Union and the other 
elements in the structure which will be necessary to embrace the greater 
Europe.
At this point we need to go to the other end of the spectrum. The posi­
tion of East Germany raises particular problems and I would only stress 
that this is a matter best dealt with under the umbrella of the European 
Community. But leaving this on one side, there is no reasonable prospect 
that in the foreseeable future the countries of Eastern Europe will join or 
be able to join an economic and political union with the countries of 
Western Europe. Indeed, the most that can be contemplated at least as a 
first step — the significance of this qualification I shall explain later — 
would be the creation of a free trade area, such as exists at present be­
tween the EFTA countries and the Community. A free trade area involves 
no derogation from sovereignty and is compatible with complete and 
continuing independence in the political field. Free trade areas exist out­
side Europe — recent examples are the U.S./Canada free trade agree­
ments and a similar accord between Australia and New Zealand. In prin­
ciple such a development gives rise to no insuperable problem although 
the detail can be fraught with difficulty. But a “free trade area” does not 
in any sense constitute a form of Community membership. This — and its 
implications — need to be clearly understood.
The European Community itself is not, and never has been, simply a 
free trade area. There is much misunderstanding on this point, particu­
larly in my own country: and the position therefore needs to be made 
crystal clear.
The Community started as a customs union — but in case this gives too 
narrow a view perhaps it would be better to say that the customs union 




























































































common external tariff and a common external trade policy. The powers 
for this purpose must be vested in a supra-national body. Consequently, 
the Community started life with the Member States transferring their 
sovereignty to the Community in one of the most sensitive of all fields, 
namely fiscal policy; a matter which seems to be overlooked by latter-day 
defenders of national sovereignty. It is of the essence of a customs union 
that once goods have lawfully entered the territory of the customs union 
they are entitled to freedom of circulation throughout the whole territory 
of the customs union, thus avoiding many of the troubles and complica­
tions of a free trade area. It also follows from this that the freedom of 
movement of goods is an essential corollary of the freedom of circulation 
that the customs union is designed to achieve.
The EFTA countries are no longer satisfied with the conventional type 
of free trade agreement. Quite apart from the difficulties — not just ad­
ministrative but economic as well — that rules of origin give rise to, 
there is the feeling that the “weaker” partner, in this case the EFTA 
countries, are having rules imposed on them that they have no say to in 
the formulation. There is the feeling too that the benefits of free trade 
should not be confined to goods but should extend also to services: that 
market opening measures taken by the Community should be extended to 
the EFTA countries, and so on. The close physical proximity of the 
EFTA countries to the Community countries and the close trading rela­
tionships give added force to these feelings. As I mentioned earlier, in 
1984 a declaration was signed by the Community and the EFTA countries 
at Luxembourg which provided for the creation of a “European economic 
space”. Since then much effort has been deployed to making this a reality, 
although to be frank there has been more effort than result. Currently 
there is much discussion among the EFTA countries themselves about 
their future relationship with the Community: one country — Austria — 
has already applied for membership: others may follow. There is talk also 
of a customs union to replace the present free trade agreement.
All this has to be judged against a background in which the Community 
itself is developing rapidly. If the Community — or the greater part of it 
— develops into a full blown economic and political union this may mean 
that membership is no longer a feasible option for countries that might 
otherwise have wished to join.
We have, therefore, a situation where at one extreme there would be a 
full political and economic union embracing probably fewer than the pre­
sent twelve Member States: and at the other extreme a simple, traditional 
free trade area. What can we put in between to accommodate those Euro­
pean states which want more than a simple free trade relationship but are 
not prepared or able to accept full political and economic union?
Precisely what form the new structure would take in the case of these 
countries will I believe largely be dictated by negotiation between the 
EFTA countries and the Community influenced in greater or lesser de­




























































































political and economic union. It is relevant that the two most important 
countries which might fall into this last group were themselves originally 
members of EFT A.
The most promising form this new relationship would take would be an 
extended customs union embracing services as well as goods. Services, of 
course, are not normally subject to customs duties but the cardinal feature 
of a customs union, namely the freedom of circulation within the terri­
tory of the customs union, is critically important in the case of services.
In short, the structures which emerged on the basis of this approach 
would be very close to the core of the “1992” programme shorn of some 
of its more contentious aspects. Such an extended customs union would 
need in one way or another to accommodate agricultural products as well. 
There are various ways this could be done, the simplest from the technical 
point of view being that the members of the union would follow the 
prices set by the CAP but the costs would fall directly on the countries 
concerned.
The Pattern of the Greater Europe
A European structure of this sort — namely “the European Union” em­
bracing most but not all of the present members of the Community, an 
extended customs union embracing a further group of countries closely 
associated with the European Union — mainly the EFTA countries plus 
those of the present Community membership not joining the European 
Union — and a free trade area bringing in the rest — or virtually the rest 
— of Europe — is a logical development of the trends which are already 
apparent. It has the added virtues of being stable, coherent and flexible. It 
offers too the prospect of further development. Countries could if they so 
wished, and agreement was forthcoming, progress from the free trade 
area to the customs union or from the customs union to membership of 
the full European Union.
The Institutional Aspects
I have not touched upon the institutional aspects of such a Europe-wide 
stmcture. To do so would entail an impossibly long extension of this lec­
ture. And it is also likely to prove the most difficult and the most con­
tentious part of the whole exercise. It is not just the question of the trans­
fer or merger of sovereignty. The most sensitive point is “to whom?”. 
Interestingly, this proved one of the most difficult points in the negotia­
tion of the American constitution. In our own case, the European Parlia­
ment has already staked out its claim. It will be strongly resisted by some 
Member States particularly where, as in the United Kingdom, the Euro­




























































































continental countries where there is “freedom of movement” between na­
tional parliaments and the European Parliament, the transfer would not be 
regarded as so outrageous. I suspect in the end some compromise formula 
will be found — as indeed it was in the U.S. — with the adoption of a bi­
cameral system, the Upper House effectively representing the Member 
States as Mr. Michael Heseltine has suggested. But this in turn raises the 
further problem whether that Upper House should be elected, or non- 
elected as the present Council of Ministers is — and indeed the House of 
Lords in my own country; and critically also the powers of this “Upper 
House” in relation to the “Lower House”.
Although it may sound surprising to say so, to some degree I regard 
this discussion at this stage as academic. “Political union” will be achieved 
by means of a number of steps in separate areas — many of these areas 
constitute parts of economic and monetary union but to these will be 
added foreign policy, which to some extent is already covered by political 
co-operation, defence, internal security and ultimately I suspect basic so­
cial security provisions. The institutions needed for these developments 
will evolve, to a large degree ad hoc, but they and the experience they 
generate will contribute to, and indeed will point to the way forward. I 
think this kind of evolutionary development is much more likely — and 
much more likely to succeed — than any attempt at this stage to produce a 
“grand design”.
What I have said reflects my own somewhat cautious approach to these 
fundamental issues. But there is always the possibility that we may see a 
re-run of what happened with the Messina Conference and the Treaty of 
Rome, namely a sudden emergence of a determination to have done with 
the talking and get on with the action. The Treaty of Rome set out the 
principles and provided a “transitional period” of twelve years for the 
detail to be thrashed out. In other words, the “step by step” approach took 
place after the treaty was signed, not before. Perhaps in the end that is 
how you do make progress.
Political and Economic Implications
The political strength of the European Union embracing 250 million 
people or more would be absolutely immense. Moreover, it would be 
backed by an economic area, joined to it by a customs union or free trade 
area making it by far and away the biggest and most powerful economic 
entity in the world. The European Union would thus take its place as one 
of the three or four super powers of the world.
This of course is “potential”. The part actually played by the European 
Union would depend on the cohesiveness of its constituent parts, on the 
extent to which it was able to mobilise the strength of the whole economic 
area of which it formed the most influential part and on the policies it de­




























































































cal or economic forces that either their population or potential would jus­
tify, whether this is by choice or by an inability to develop that potential. 
Nor does Japan play the role its economic strength would justify although 
it is now somewhat hesitatingly beginning to emerge from the wings of 
the stage.
The European Union, because of its long democratic traditions, its cul­
ture and its approach to human problems, would be a great liberalising 
influence in the world.
The economic consequences are much more obvious and much more 
urgent. Whatever happens we must try and avoid the absurdities of the 
“fortress Europe” campaign waged by elements in America and Japan. 
Based as it was on confusion, misunderstanding and to some degree mis­
representation, it achieved nothing other than create suspicion and make 
co-operation in solving the inevitable problems of change more difficult. 
The European Community has always been a powerful force for liberal­
ism in world trade. I would expect its greater and more powerful succes­
sor to be the same. Certainly it would be very much in its own interest to 
be so.
Conclusion
It is I think important to ask ourselves what is the motivation behind the 
development of the European Union and the restructuring of relationships 
in Europe as a whole.
Politics is the pursuit of power. One can see this in its most naked form 
in the case of the two super powers, the United States and Russia. Each in 
their own way was seeking world domination, although both would prob­
ably each in their own way express it somewhat differently. But since 
Vietnam, the political ambitions of the United States have lost momentum: 
and economic problems have given impetus to this change in emphasis. 
Russia too has been faced with a situation which would have been incon­
ceivable even a few years ago, with massive internal dissent, the growth 
of nationalism and the clear determination of most of the conquered terri­
tories in Europe to regain their independence. We already see both the 
United States and Russia turning in upon themselves. The vacuum thus left 
— and it is essentially a European vaacum — must be filled, and I hope 
and believe it will be filled, by Europe itself and in a new and restruc­
tured form. Russia in particular is an Asiatic power, not a European one: 
and she has no real place in Europe. This is not to deny the importance of 
Russia, but she is neither entitled to a dominant voice in Europe nor is it 
in her own interests to seek to exercise such a domination. The motivation 
of such a new Europe will not be essentially a global political motive. Eu­
rope will take its place as a super power but it will not do so with global 




























































































We are, I hope and trust, eternally grateful to the American people for 
the massive contribution they made to the restructuring of Europe after 
the war: and for the defence they provided against the Russians in their 
days of aggression. But times have changed and we must change with 
them. It is a different world and it demands different policies.
The objective of the original treaties was the preservation of peace: and 
because economic rivalry was so often the root cause of war, the treaties 
set out to achieve the objective through economic union. That, in my 
view, remains the correct objective and the correct path to its achieve­
ment. If we look forward not just to the European Union, but in time to a 
greater European Union embracing all the countries of Europe, both the 
objective and the path must be primarily an economic one. If peace can 
best be secured by prosperity, then it is prosperity we must create.
Very rarely has mankind been offered such an opportunity. There are 
many people who would regard this pursuit of peace based on prosperity 
as “idealistic”, the term having a pejorative connotation. But that is a su­
perficial view. What has happened in the world is that warfare between 
the great powers is no longer a feasible option. There will be wars be­
tween lesser powers as we have seen in recent years and from time to 
time the great powers will get involved directly or indirectly. But so far 
as the great powers themselves are concerned the struggle for influence 
and power will be an economic one and a philosophical one. This is the 
scenario to which we must now turn our minds and this is the basis on 
which we must draw up our plans for Europe’s development. In short, it 
is the European Community which now moves to centre stage. The re­
sponsibility falls on us: and we must shoulder our responsibilities.
I have in this lecture set out the basis on which that development should 
take place to achieve the objectives we want to attain. It is a perfectly fea­
sible scenario based on both history and the needs of our times. As I have 
said, it is stable but flexible: it provides room for development. It is evo­
lutionary: not revolutionary. Above all, it reflects the aspirations of the 
European people. We have reached the stage where visions need to be 
translated into reality. What we now need are the statesmen to seize the 




























































































The 1992 Challenge: 
The External Discussion
Sir David Hannay
I thought that it might be useful to discuss this evening a subject which has 
received less attention in the recent consideration of 1992 and the Single 
Market than the internal development of the market, that is, the external 
implications of a Europe which has established a Single Market. I think 
this is a subject which has been less often addressed and less fully consid­
ered than has the internal development of the Community, and that it is 
therefore perhaps useful to spend a little time on it, because as somebody 
observed, “no man is an island” (always a helpful reminder to the British 
who spend a lot of time thinking about islands). It is also important for 
the Community to remember that. There are moments in Brussels when it 
is quite difficult to remember that there are a lot of other people around 
who are rather interested in what we are doing. There is a tendency when 
the internal development of the Community becomes very intense to for­
get about this. So I thought I would look at the external implications of 
the 1992 challenge as the title of this talk has called it.
1992, the Single Market and all its manifestations, has aroused extraor­
dinary interest around the world. Rather unexpectedly, I think, for its 
protagonists in Brussels had been hard at work without initially thinking 
that this was a major world event as well as a major European event. If 
anybody did think it was only a European event and not a world event, 
they certainly do not think so now, because the reactions to what is being 
done in Brussels are extremely marked: in the United States; in Japan; 
among the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the Lomé Conven­
tion; among the EFTA neighbours of the Community who are of course 
deeply concerned; and among the Eastern Europeans (who in recent years 
have changed their attitude very sharply, not only towards the Commu­
nity, but also towards what they think the Community is going to be­
come). In a sense the Single Market project has put the Community on the 
map in world terms in a way that nothing it has ever done before has suc­
ceeded in doing. I think that in itself is a cause for some satisfaction, but it 
is certainly not a cause for any complacency because quite a lot of the re­



























































































tions of alarm, concern, and worry as to whether this Single Market will 
somehow turn in on itself or be fundamentally protectionist in its devel­
opment. Of course, one does not need to accept the most alarmist expres­
sions of concern and worry particularly from the United States, but it is 
important to recognise that in this venture there are downside risks as 
well as upside opportunities. We have to realise that we need to pursue 
and develop an external policy for this Single Market if it is not to turn 
into something which we do not particularly want it to be. The Commu­
nity has not always in its history been particularly good at pursuing and 
furthering its external interests. It has tended to put the internal first. It 
has tended to find it rather difficult to get into focus, and into agreed fo­
cus, its external development. So this will, I think, require more effort in 
the next few years and therefore needs to be thought about carefully.
To some extent any attempt to look at the future external policy of the 
Community, of a Single Market, which I am assuming will in fact exist in 
1992, is an exercise in futurology. Diplomats like myself, being people 
who think that Lord Wilson exaggerated greatly when he said, “a week is 
a long time in politics”, find themselves at some disadvantage when trying 
to address a period as far as three years or four years ahead. So I will ask 
more questions than I will provide answers. In this case you also have to 
make certain assumptions about the Single Market. What I would assume 
is that there will be a substantial success in achieving a Single Market by 
the end of 1992, but it will not be a Single Market without imperfections 
any more than the United States is a single market without imperfections 
or any other you like to think of in the world. It will then be a recognis- 
ably different economic unit than the one which we have known so far, 
operating rather differently. It will not be a federal state. It will still be a 
hybrid somewhere between a loose collection of states operating purely 
inter-govemmentally and a superstate. Furthermore, in this talk I am 
keeping away from the traditional foreign policy field which I think will 
probably move more slowly in the direction of greater unity than will the 
external economic policy which I plan to concentrate on.
Anyone addressing the Community’s external relations, whether foreign 
policy or external economic policy, has to remember that it is even less 
under our control than are internal developments in the Community. 
Fundamental changes take place around the Community, either in an un­
predictable way or in an unpredicted way. Upheavals occur and the Com­
munity has no real alternative but to adjust, to react to them, to adapt. It 
is quite wrong to think that you can devise an external policy which can 
be carried through without any adaptation or reaction to other people. 
This is not an area in which drawing up blueprints is particularly helpful. 
Even the United States has had to recognise over the past thirty years that 
superpowers cannot, as it were, carry the whole world on their shoulders. 





























































































I have divided the talk into four areas to try to avoid the trap that 
speakers on foreign policy often fall into, that is the dreaded tour d’hor­
izon, which starts moving eastwards or westwards — depending on which 
it is — and gradually takes you all the way round the world and back 
again. With reference to this external economic policy field, I will 
address the following: multilateral policy; Europe’s relations with the de­
veloping countries; Europe’s relations with Eastern Europe; and the ques­
tion of future enlargement and the relationship with the EFTA countries.
Multilateral Economic Relations
The Community has of course been one of the main multilateral economic 
players since it was established in 1958. You only have to look at the his­
tory of the Kennedy round, the Tokyo round and other major multilateral 
negotiations, the Community’s participation in the seven- nation economic 
summits and so on, to see that. But the Single Market will make it a more 
important player in all these areas than it has ever been before; and if the 
sort of predictions made by people like Paolo Cecchini as to the economic 
effects of the Single Market are borne out, the importance of its role will 
become even greater. Because if the Community is in fact able to achieve 
a rate of sustainable non-inflationary growth above that which it would 
have achieved without the creation of the Single Market, this will proba­
bly be one of the most important contributions to world economic devel­
opment in the years ahead.
From its beginning the Community has been formally committed to a 
liberal external economic policy. I beg slightly the question as to how 
well it has achieved that, but it has been committed to it. That is what the 
Treaty of Rome and its preamble states, and that is why there was never 
really any question as to whether or not a Single Market would be a 
“Fortress Europe” because the commitment is perfectly clear that it can­
not be so. Even if that commitment was not there in the Treaty, it would 
certainly be against the economic interests of the Community to develop 
in a protectionist way, given that a much higher percentage of its eco­
nomic activity is in fact contained in external trade than most of the other 
major players around the world like the United States and the Soviet 
Union, though not of course Japan.
In recent months it has become rather fashionable to look at the evolv­
ing Single Market, at the developments taking place in the Pacific with 
Japan and the nations of the Pacific rim and at the U.S.-Canadian Free 
Trade Area, and to say that here you will have three large units operating 
as something like single markets; and to go on from this to draw the con­
clusion that this means you will not need these multilateral disciplines and 
negotiations any more. They will become otiose or unsustainable. In par­
ticular, it has been suggested that the GATT will no longer be able to 




























































































not think really stands up to careful scrutiny. I accept it is the case that 
these three centres of economic integration are indeed developing. But I 
would argue that that makes multilateral disciplines and negotiations more 
necessary, even if more difficult to achieve and to sustain rather than less 
so. Because otherwise there will be no machinery for resolving the inevi­
table frictions — and you only have to look at the development of U.S. 
trade and economic relations with the Community to see that these fric­
tions occur all the time. Without a multilateral framework, they will tend 
to get out of control if you just leave them to be resolved in a bilateral or 
trilateral process between these three large units. The results will be dam­
aging for the three large units themselves and they will be disastrous for 
those who are not in the three large units, for when the elephants trample 
the jungle the smaller animals tend to get rather badly treated.
So I think there is a major challenge for the Community of 1992 to 
reinforce the GATT process and to work for its strengthening. Currently, 
the Uruguay Round is the principle focus of that. It will not be easy to 
bring it to a successful conclusion. The GATT negotiations only just es­
caped deadlock in April, and must complete an extremely ambitious pro­
gramme by December 1990. The Community’s role in it will be 
important.
Obviously this is so in agriculture where reform of the Common Agri­
cultural Policy has made some progress. There have been considerable 
achievements and, heaven knows, they have been difficult to attain, but 
they are not enough. The momentum to make the CAP more market-ori­
ented will need to be sustained. There is a real risk that the Agricultural 
Council — which is not at the best of times particularly reform-minded 
— will suffer from reform fatigue, a feeling which is well known to seize 
agricultural ministers quite easily. That would be pretty disastrous as to 
the possibilities of getting any agreement in the GATT. We are at the 
moment living in a bit of a fool’s paradise because the effects of the 
drought in the United States last year have been so beneficial to the fi­
nancing of the agricultural policy that we have the impression we are do­
ing extremely well. The cost of the Agricultural Policy in 1990 is likely 
to be 4.5 billion ecu under predicted budget. That is quite a lot. But that is 
not, alas, mainly due to our efforts of reform, although it is partly due to 
them; it is mainly due to the level of world prices which has moved up 
after the American drought and, more recently, with the strengthening of 
the dollar. That movement will of course bring a counter-reaction as 
surely as day follows night. There will be a production response to higher 
prices, and scientists continue to provide ever more ways of growing 
more on less land in a more productive way. Then we will be back again 
in a situation where the Community has got to find ways of reducing the 
amount of support that it gives and of making its farmers more market 
oriented. That is not to say that the prospect of removing all agricultural 
support is a realistic one. It was wise of the Americans to drop that pro­




























































































tives, and it is important in this case that what the Community tries to do 
is attainable. So that is the first major part of the Uruguay Round which 
will have to be got right if we are to avoid a reversion to a kind of bid­
ding-up of subsidies with the United States which the Community will not 
win. We will waste huge quantities of tax payers’ money, we will damage 
the third world, whose agricultural policies cannot hold up in a situation 
like that, and we will end up with a ceaseless trade war.
But there is more to the Uruguay Round than that. There are the nego­
tiations on services, the first time that anyone has ever tried to bring the 
service industries into a multilateral discipline. This, in my view, is cru­
cial to the European Community’s future prosperity because if the devel­
oping countries are to be given the place in world trade that they must 
have if they are to earn their living, we cannot go on hoping to earn all 
our living out of manufacturing, and we will need to earn more and more 
of our living through the service industries. It must therefore be of fun­
damental interest and benefit to the European Community that the service 
industries, whether you are talking about banking or insurance or indus­
trial property or telecommunications, be liberalised and the Community 
must take the lead in this respect if we are to earn our bread and butter in 
the future as successfully as we have done in the past.
Finally, in that old classical area of trade policy quantitative restric­
tions, we still have some rather difficult external problems to solve before 
we get to a Single Market in 1992. The case which one reads most about 
in the papers is the question of car imports and how to produce a single 
policy out of something very disparate, with the almost complete openness 
of the German, Benelux and Danish markets, the middle position of the 
British market, and the very closed positions of the French, Spanish and 
above all, of the Italian markets. That will not be very easy, but the 
Commission is beginning to point ahead to the only realistic policy, which 
is to phase out these restrictions pretty quickly to avoid at all costs replac­
ing them by an overall Community restrictive policy. A restrictive policy 
like that would, as the American studies which were carried out on 
American restraints placed on Japanese car exports demonstrate, simply 
end up making every single car in Europe cost the comsumer a lot more 
than it need do.
The Japanese care less than you might think. They are paid more for 
their cars than they would otherwise have got even if they sell less of 
them. But the European consumer and its economy in the long run bear 
the burden. So I think the unwisdom of a policy like that is now well 
recognised in Brussels. But there are great sensitivities, particularly in the 
Member States which have operated restrictions so far, and it will not be 




























































































Relations with the Developing Countries
Turning now away from the multilateral field to relations with the devel­
oping countries, I think that in the Europe of 1992 a certain tension — 
which has been there in the Community’s external economic policy from 
the very beginning — will remain, between the area which you might call 
can the area of concentration: the Lomé Convention; the African- 
Caribbean-Pacific countries, 66 of them, with whom we have a very 
privileged relationship — a complex one with instruments of aid policy, 
trade policy, stabilisation of their export receipts and so on — and our 
relationship with those other developing countries in Latin America and 
Asia with whom we have a somewhat less structured and elaborate policy. 
I think that tension will remain because I do not think the Community will 
possibly, even in 1992, be able to bear the burden of extending the Lomé 
arrangements to all the developing countries. It is possible that some 
aspects of it may develop on a world wide basis, but I think the Commu­
nity will continue to give a preference to some extent to those African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries and to the countries of the Mediterranean 
who are geographically closest to it. That will create a certain tension 
particularly with Spain and Portugal now in the Community and with the 
Spaniards feeling very strongly that similar arrangements should be made 
for Latin America. I do not see a fundamental shift there and I do not 
think that the Community can really take that on. It would be wise to 
recognise that even a Community in a Single Market will need to have 
some pluralism in its approach to the external world. In aid policy there 
will tend to be some heritage of a historical kind. That is to say, that in 
the terms of the U.K. there will be something of a concentration on the 
countries of the Indian sub-continent; Italy and Spain have tended to be 
much more interested in Latin America. I think that this is something 
which in a world of rather limited resources it is not wise to be too cate­
gorically opposed to, because if you are, you may end up trying to do too 
much and that leads only to endless beauty contests in the Community as 
to whether we like this or that or the other part of the world more.
In the Community’s relations with the developing countries environ­
mental considerations will play a much bigger role in the Europe of 1992 
than they have in the past. It is something that we have all woken up to: 
the problems of the ozone layer, of the rain forests, and so on. The envi­
ronmental dimension of development policy is going to be greatly ex­
panded and the Community will have to find a way of playing its role too. 
Many of the problems are global problems which it makes no sense at all 
for the Community to try to solve on its own. They will have to be solved 
through a global approach and if the current United Nations environmen­
tal programme is not up to the job then it will need to strengthen it. It is 
no good trying to produce partial solutions; the global institutions needed 




























































































The Community will also have an important role to play in bringing a 
number of the new industrialised countries into bearing a greater share of 
responsibility for the multilateral trading system as well as looking to get 
benefits from it. That will be a delicate operation. Countries like Korea 
and Singapore and others, and hopefully some of the countries of Latin 
America like Brasil, will have to be brought into the full multilateral 
disciplines.
But probably the biggest single contribution that the Community of 
1992 can make in its relation with the developing countries will be to 
remain an open market and to transfer, by that openness, some of the 
benefits from some of the greater sustainable growth that we hope to 
achieve within the Community to countries outside the Community, above 
all the developing countries, and that brings one back again to the theme 
of avoiding a protectionist 1992 Single Market.
Relations with Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe is a subject of a completely different nature and one to 
which a lot of people are now beginning to turn their minds. There have 
been some important changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and 
the European Community has got to try and find an appropriate response 
to them. In doing so, however, I think we need to remember one or two 
basic tmths. One is that in terms of economic magnitude the relationship 
with these countries is only a small part of the Community’s overall 
external relationships. It is bigger in the case of some, like the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and less for others. But overall it is not a large 
part of the Community’s economic external relationship. The second thing 
that must be remembered is that most of the changes that have taken place 
so far in the economic field in these countries have been more declaratory 
than real. It is not the case that there are already new economic systems 
operating in any of these Eastern European countries, with the possible 
exception of Hungary. There are a lot of good intentions that have been 
proclaimed but they have not yet become reality. In the political sphere 
there have been very important changes, in the economic sphere they have 
not yet really taken place. A third point worth remembering is that the 
crucial developments in all these countries will be internal. It is an illu­
sion to suppose that we in the Community will have a very big impact on 
them. They will work themselves out on the basis of what is going on in 
these countries and the political developments within them. We will influ­
ence them to some extent, but only to a modest extent. Finally, in devel­
oping our economic relations with Eastern Europe we will need to seek a 
mutual advantage and reciprocity just as we do elsewhere in the world. 
There is no point in propounding the view that we must have a balance of 
mutual advantage in the development of our relations with the United 




























































































just simply forgetting about that when it comes to Eastern Europe. That is 
not to be unduly hard-nosed, it is just that that is the only basis on which 
we will develop a long-term fruitful relationship. And if those countries 
are to move towards market economies and away from a centrally 
controlled one, they need to open themselves up to us every bit as much as 
we do to them.
Over the last fifteen years the Community has in fact had quite a 
successful policy towards Eastern Europe. The Community has always 
said that the East European countries must deal with the Community as 
such. Now they are all doing exactly that, after many years of refusing to 
do so. We now have a Soviet Ambassador in Brussels whose only job is to 
deal with the European Community. The Community has always said that 
the primary objective was to foster relations between the Community and 
the individual Eastern European countries, and not just with Comecon. 
That has also now been brought to a successful conclusion. The Commu­
nity does have a very modest joint declaration with Comecon. But the 
main thrust of developments is with the individual countries. The Com­
munity has always said that we should differentiate in our relationship 
with these countries depending on their economic and political develop­
ment. That too is beginning to take shape in the different kinds of agree­
ments the Community is working out. With Hungary, on the one hand, 
there is a rather advanced type of agreement with provision for extensive 
economic cooperation. The same is true with Poland. With Czechoslo­
vakia, which has not conducted any very substantial reforms of any sort, 
either political or economic, there is a very modest classical trade agree­
ment. Perhaps most strikingly of all, with regard to Romania, whose hu­
man rights record is very poor, the Community has decided recently not 
to allow any further development of the economic and trade relationship 
until that record is improved. That in a way is an example of the differ­
entiation which will, I believe, more and more characterise the Com­
munity of 1992’s external relationship with Eastern Europe. The political 
strand and the economic strand of the relationship will be brought to­
gether. We will now need to, in as imaginative a way as we can, try to 
give some modest help to these countries to achieve what they are trying 
to achieve themselves: to open up their economies; to develop them as 
something closer to a market economy. There are ways in which we can 
help with training, with providing some kind of instruction on ma­
nagement and so on. But the solutions tried in the 1970s with massive 
injections of credit are not, I think, a sensible basis for policy in this 
present period.
The political element will remain very important. If the Soviet Union 
and its allies, above all the Soviet Union, do reduce their disproportionate 
armaments, particularly in the conventional but also in the nuclear field, 
and if the Soviet Union does follow up its withdrawal from Afghanistan 
by forswearing other overseas third world adventures, then I would think 




























































































Community and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are pretty good. If 
they do not, if for some reason or other — and I am not speculating about 
Mr. Gorbachev’s likely tenure of power because it seems to be a pretty 
unfruitful subject, although that does not stop everyone from speculating 
about it — but if for some reason or another they do not definitively turn 
back on the policies of earlier years, then the prospects will of course be 
much less positive. I rather prefer President Delors’ image of our living 
in a European village rather than Mr. Gorbachev’s view that we are liv­
ing in a common European house. Lots of people live together in villages 
and there are people in various parts of the village who get on with their 
lives. We are living in the Community House and I do not myself think 
that it is realistic to suppose that any of the countries of Eastern Europe 
will in the foreseeable future be living in it with us. But we are all living 
in the same village and that involves certain care and consideration for 
other people who are living in the village, even if they continue to live in 
different houses.
Finally, to turn to what is probably the most difficult aspect of the 
Community’s external economic relationship, enlargement, most difficult 
because it might cease to be an external one at all. There is the question of 
whether or not the Community will again enlarge — get new members — 
and if so in what way and time frame that will be. There is no doubt that 
the Community’s success in recent years has led to a strong interest in 
membership amongst a considerable range of countries. We are beginning 
to see the fruit of that. First of all there has been a Turkish application. 
That is the only one actually on the table. There is likely to be an Austrian 
application very soon, perhaps within two or three months. There is a lot 
of talk in Cyprus and in Malta about applications. There is a pretty lively 
debate in Norway and in Sweden. Of the EFTA countries, only Switzer­
land and Finland have said quite firmly that they are not at the moment 
interested in membership.
That is a pretty formidable list both in its length and in its disparity. I 
think the first thing that has to be said about it is that in contemplating 
even the possibility of enlargement to such a wide list and range of coun­
tries one is looking much more at the sort of debate that had to take place 
in the Community in the 1960s when Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ire­
land first applied, than the sort of very limited debate that took place 
when first Greece and then Spain and Portugal joined. In the latter case 
the actual content of the negotiations was largely technical, even if the 
choices for those three countries were very fundamental and important 
and political. I think one is now going to have to look again at a range of 
questions of the type, “What sort of Community are we thinking of?”, and 
“What should it be doing in the future?”, and these questions will not be 
easy to answer.
It is also important to remember that there are some very complex con­
nections between the applications of different aspirant countries. If, for 




























































































that were accepted by the Community, then that will have clear implica­
tions for Sweden who has always said that its own neutrality was an ob­
stacle to joining the Community. Sweden could hardly go on saying that 
(although it could of course decide that it did not want to join the Com­
munity) if Austria had joined having posed and had accepted the condition 
of its neutrality. Attitudes to applications by neutrals would also have 
implications for any decision by the Community on the Turkish applica­
tion. Turkey is, after all, a long-standing NATO member.
These connections are very complicated and they will not be easy to 
handle. The first thing that has to be said about the Community of today is 
that it is not yet ready to handle them. When people say, “Let’s look at 
that in about 1992”, they are not saying it will be a straightforward 
business to enlarge the Community then; they are rather deciding that it 
will perhaps be a little bit easier to answer some of these fundamental 
questions then.
So I think enlargement is going to become a very difficult thing for the 
Community of 1992 to handle. It is one that in a strange sense is being 
precipitated by the very success of 1992, but that success does not itself 
provide us with the right answers to the question of enlargement. Mean­
while, there is a very interesting development between the Community 
and the EFTA countries involving a much strengthened relationship be­
tween them and the Community in ways which would probably have been 
considered quite unthinkable when the original free trade agreements 
between the EFTA countries and the Community were negotiated. This 
has, of course, itself got some connection with the enlargement issue, be­
cause to some extent people are hoping that if that relationship can pros­
per then that will in itself perhaps provide an answer short of enlarge­
ment, short of accession, for quite a number of the countries which are 
currently showing an interest in much closer relations with the Commu­
nity. Whether it will do so or not is, I think, difficult to be clear about at 
this stage. But the development of the Community’s relationship with 
EFTA does look as if it is so much in the interests of both sides without 
that consideration that I think it will make considerable progress.
Thus, it may be seen that the external agenda of this Community of 
1992, of this Single Market, imperfect though it may be, is a formidable 
one. This agenda will certainly not all be accomplished smoothly. Since 
the Community will still be the hybrid — neither a simple international 
organisation nor a superstate — it will continue to find it extremely diffi­
cult to handle these external issues, but it will not be able to escape from 
the need to find solutions for them. And I think it will increasingly do so 
on a joint and common basis. It will be hard work. Probably quite a few 
mistakes will be made along the way. The accusation will frequently be 
heard, and sometimes justified, as in the past, that the Community is 
better at dealing with its internal problems than its external ones. So I 
think that an effort to look into these external issues, in places like this 



















































































































































































































































































European Political Cooperation 
1970-1990:
A Tale of Two Decades
Sir Julian Bullard
I. Origins and Early Years
It would be hard to fix an exact time and place for the birth of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). After the failure of the Fouchet negotiations 
in 1962, it was another 7 years before the Member States, still only six in 
number, took the first practical steps towards adding a political wing to 
the economic structure of the Community — animated, no doubt, by the 
argument that, with domestic and foreign trade policies increasingly co­
ordinated and unified, the continued existence of six entirely separate 
foreign policies was illogical, and potentially damaging. It was in Decem­
ber 1969 that the six European Heads of Government, meeting in The 
Hague, instructed their Foreign Ministers “to study the best way of 
achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the con­
text of enlargement”.
The Report produced by Foreign Ministers in response to this instruc­
tion was the work of a Committee chaired by the then Political Director 
of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, Etienne Davignon. Adopted by Foreign 
Ministers in Luxembourg in October 1970, the Report would have been 
enough to secure Davignon’s place in the history of the Community, even 
without his later services in other more important capacities. For the 
central features of EPC, as they exist today, were already contained in the 
Luxembourg Report.
What the Davignon Committee recommended was that no new organi­
zation should be created, but that EPC should be developed as a new pat­
tern of activity using existing organizations. The proposal was that For­
eign Ministers of the Member States should meet twice a year; Political 
Directors at least four times a year, under the name “Political Commit­
tee”; and experts (i.e. less senior officials) as necessary, on the instruc­
tions of the Political Committee. The purpose of such meetings was de­



























































































formation and consultation, a better mutual understanding of the major 
international problems, to strengthen solidarity among Member States, to 
help the harmonization of their views and, where possible and desirable, 
to act jointly.
We see here, laid down in 1970, the main characteristics which EPC 
retains 20 years later. It is not an organization, but an activity. It has no 
headquaters, no staff, no budget, still less a transport pool, salary struc­
ture or pension scheme (It is therefore very cheap). It comprises meetings 
at fixed intervals and at three levels, the middle level (Political Directors) 
being the most important. And it rests on the obligation to try to adopt a 
common view, not on the obligation actually to do so. The distinction is 
significant, as we shall see later.
The importance of the Political Committee, it should be explained, does 
not lie solely in the fact that this is the level at which work generated 
from below by experts comes together with work handed down from 
above by Ministers. The Political Committee is also unique in that it con­
sists of officials who for the most part write their own instructions. This 
gives its proceedings a different quality from those of, for example, the 
North Atlantic Council, or even the Committee of the Permanent Repre­
sentatives (COREPER). The Political Director, being the Chief Policy 
adviser to his Foreign Minister and in constant touch with him, will not 
only know what that Minister decided when the point at issue last came 
up, but will usually also be in a position to judge with some accuracy what 
would be his decision on a new point if it were to be submitted to him. 
All this gives the Political Committee a degree of autonomy and a capac­
ity for rapid decision-making that are not found in other groupings.
It was not long before the Luxembourg arrangements were found to be 
inadequate. In July 1973, in Copenhagen, the six Foreign Ministers of the 
original Member States, joined now by those of Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland, decided on certain improvements. It was agreed that henceforth 
Foreign Ministers should meet four times a year, instead of twice, and 
Political Directors as often as necessary. Secondly, two new features were 
introduced: a liaison group of “Correspondants”, one in each Foreign 
Ministry, as a point of administrative and procedural contact; and a secure 
communications network called COREU, used only for EPC traffic be­
tween Foreign Ministries and with the Commission. As to the basic obli­
gation of Member States, it was agreed that the “purpose of consultations 
was to seek, where necessary or desirable, common policies on practical 
problems of concern to Europe”. The restrictive language speaks for it­
self. At that stage (1973) the Member States were far from ready to ac­
cept that all international problems were of concern to Europe, or that a 
common policy would always be necessary or desirable.
The 1970s saw one further innovation, which affected EPC as well as 
the work of Community. This occurred in 1974, when the Foreign Minis­
ters (still nine in number) decided, in addition to their meetings, to meet 




























































































munity or EPC questions, or both. These became known as “Gymnich 
weekends”, after the Schloss near Bonn where the first such meeting was 
held. Their operational value was not the same as that of regular EPC 
meetings, where such bureaucratic features as the Agenda and Summary 
of Conclusions had long since been introduced,1 but it was clear that 
Ministers found them useful — perhaps not least because they were not 
inhibited by officials at their elbows with notebooks and pencils.
The next advance occurred in October 1981, when Foreign Ministers 
adopted in London a further Report worked out at a series of meeting of 
officials. Once again the improvements covered both substances and pro­
cedure. The obligation of mutual consultations was somewhat strength­
ened. The word “security” was introduced for the first time into the 
EPC’s area of responsibility, though only with the prefix “political 
aspects.” And on procedure, the Commission was admitted to all EPC 
meetings as of right;2 the Presidency was strengthened by the secondment 
to it of officials from the preceding and subsequent Presidencies, to form 
the so-called “Troika”; under the influence of the Afghanistan crisis of 
1979-80, a procedure for calling emergency meetings at short notice was 
introduced; and a new emphasis was placed on the political “Dialogues” 
which the Member States had by this time begun to develop with impor­
tant third countries, and also with groupings such as ASEAN.
II. EPC in the Early 1980s
At this stage it may be useful to give some brief case studies from the 
early 1980s to illustrate how EPC worked in that period, and how its 
strong and weak points progressively emerged to form the background to 
the proposals for reform which later took shape in the Single European 
Act.
a) Afghanistan 1979-80
Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, and it soon be­
came clear that the West, including Europe, was faced with a crisis of 
major dimensions. It cannot be said that EPC responded well to the chal-
1 Since there was no Secretariat (until 1987), both Agenda and Summary of Conclu­
sions were the responsibility of the Presidency. The practice was for the R e le v é  d e s  
C o n c lu s io n s , always in French, to be circulated by the Presidency as soon as possible 
after each meeting, and finalised at a meeting of Correspondants. This is one place in the 
EPC system where the French language was accorded superior status to English. The rule 
during meetings was for all participants to speak one and understand both.
2 Hitherto the Commission’s representative had been invited to the Political Directors’ 




























































































lenge. The Irish Presidency was in its last days, the Italian Presidency was 
still waiting in the wings, emergency procedures did not yet exist. The re­
sult was a certain degree of Western coordination, but led by the United 
States, not from Europe. It was at American suggestion that Britain called 
an ad hoc meeting of selected Allies in London; and it was the President 
of the United States who made the first practical response, in the shape of 
a package of economic measures including a partial embargo on the sale 
of American grain to the USSR.
When consultations in the Nine did begin a few days later, differences 
at once emerged, both in the assessment of the situation (was the crisis to 
be seen mainly as regional in nature, or more in the East-West context?) 
and also on the question of response (withdrawal of Ambassadors? eco­
nomic sanctions? etc.). The list of European counter-measures finally 
adopted, including those elements lying within Community competence, 
comprised the following:
— a statement of condemnation, conveyed through diplomatic channels to 
the Soviet Union and its allies and to a number of Middle Eastern, South 
Asian and Islamic capitals;
— cancellation of the EC’s food aid to Afghanistan;
— emergency EC aid for Afghan refugees;
— an EC undertaking not to replace cereals embargoed by the United 
States;
— reduction in the level and scale of contacts with the USSR.
In addition, some Member States were among those whose national teams, 
or parts of them, followed the American example and cancelled their 
participation in the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow — a gesture which 
probably caught the public attention more than all other measures 
combined.
One other idea emerged from EPC during those weeks. This was a sug­
gestion by the British Foreign Secretary for a Treaty of Afghan neutral­
ity. Lord Carrington argued that such a proposal would be in line with 
Afghan history; would be difficult for Moscow to reject; would command 
wide support in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World; and 
could eventually serve as a basis for a political settlement.
The British idea attracted much support among the Nine, but not 
enough to constitute a consensus or supply a basis for action. Not until a 
year later (July 1981), when Britain had the Presidency, was Lord Car­
rington able to fly to Moscow and present a revised proposal, this time 
for a Conference on Afghan Neutrality out of which it was hoped that a 
Treaty might grow. As a member of Lord Carrington’s delegation, the 
author had the satisfaction of witnessing at first hand this landmark in the 
development of EPC. The proposed conference did not take place, nor 
was a Treaty of Afghan Neutrality signed, but there was no mistaking the 




























































































as he listened to this well-prepared and strongly supported diplomatic ini­
tiative by an organization which hitherto he had clearly despised.
The lessons to be drawn from the Afghan episode are simple. An emer­
gency procedure for calling EPC meetings at short notice was necessary, 
and one was instituted in 1981. Continuity between one Presidency and 
another must be improved. A response in words was relatively easy to 
formulate, a response in actions much more difficult, even when the case 
was as clear as the Soviet attack on a non-aligned neighbour. And there 
was room for the Nine to take a diplomatic initiative, though it was slow 
to do so.
b) The Middle East 1979-80
The Six, and later the Nine, had always given the Middle East a high pri­
ority in EPC, in keeping with their material interests and with their his­
torical connexions in the area. This sense of involvement deepened at the 
turn of the year 1979-80 as a result of certain special factors. The Egyp­
tian Israeli talks on “full autonomy” for the West Bank and Gaza were 
seen to be failing; the attention of the U.S. was beginning to switch to the 
Presidential election campaign; the crisis over Afghanistan had diverted 
attention away from the Middle East; and the EPC Presidency has passed 
to Italy, with her strong traditional links with the Near and Middle East. 
Out of these factors grew the belief that there was a serious risk of a vac­
uum developing in the Middle East peace process — a vacuum which the 
Nine were well fitted to fill.
To put together a common position on so complex a problem was an 
enterprise as difficult as any yet tackled by EPC. Once again there were 
questions of both substance and procedure. Was the word “self-determi­
nation” appropriate? In what terms, if at all, should the PLO be men­
tioned? And Camp David? Should the United States be consulted, or in­
formed, or left to make such enquiries as it chose? Would the end product 
take the form of a draft Resolution for the UN, or some other?
All these questions, and many more, had to be resolved before the so- 
called “Venice Declaration” was presented to the world by the Heads of 
Government on 13 June 1980. It was not cast in the form of a Resolution, 
but it provided a platform for a European “contact mission”, led by M. 
Thom of Luxembourg, which toured the region during the next months. 
The position of the Nine (later ten, now twelve) on the central Arab-Is- 
rael problem has rested ever since on what the Venice Declaration called 
“the two principles universally accepted by the international community; 
the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, includ­
ing Israel; and justice for all peoples, which implies the recognition of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” — followed by the word “self- 





























































































So much has happened in the Middle East in the intervening decade that 
it is hard to judge what lasting effect, if any, the Venice Declaration may 
have had. It has not brought about a Middle East settlement, nor even se­
rious talks between the parties. It did not prevent the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in June 1982, nor the partial occupation which followed. The 
“contact missions” of successive Presidencies may have done little except 
expose the impotence of the Nine.
On the other hand, it can be said, the Venice Declaration did achieve its 
objective of filling the diplomatic vacuum at the time. It encouraged mod­
erate Arabs not to lose hope of the peace process. It made it clear to Israel 
that support for her in Europe was not unconditional. It stated certain ba­
sic principles which have stood the test of the time and gained very wide 
support. And it provided, and still provides, a point of reference for the 
Member States, including the three who have joined the Community since 
1980, in formulating their policies on the Middle East.
c) Poland 1980-82
The Polish events of the early 1980s were a severe challenge to EPC. The 
Nine were agreed on the course of events to be encouraged (genuine dia­
logue with Solidarity, political reform, economic recovery) and on that to 
be prevented (repression, intervention by the Soviet Union). But it was by 
no means clear what combination of diplomatic or other activity would be 
likely to succeed in achieving the first and deterring the second. As the 
internal crisis in Poland built up during the summer of 1980, the Nine 
were tom between a feeling that “We cannot remain silent”, and a natural 
caution in the face of a situation so fraught with dangers. But a consensus 
was found for action of two kinds: sales of cheap food to Poland from the 
Community’s intervention stocks, and carefully drafted warnings that 
“others” should let Poland solve her own problems.
General Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law on 13 December 1981 
lifted some of the doubt. Repression had occurred, and the Nine con­
demned it. But the search for effective “measures” ran into the familiar 
difficulty of identifying actions which would 1) reach the right target, 2) 
be effective and 3) not damage our own interests. Uncertainty about the 
precise role of the Soviet Union was one additional complicating factor; 
another was the attitude of Greece, which had joined the Community on 1 
January 1981 but modified its policy on East-West questions following the 
success of Mr Papandreou in the elections of October that year. Thus the 
Ten found it difficult to go beyond such elementary steps as discontinuing 
the special sales of food; mounting a programme of humanitarian aid 
through Church channels; and restricting certain Soviet exports (vodka 
was one) to the Community. These measures were progressively re­





























































































What was the effect of this attempt to bring the instruments of EPC to 
bear upon a European crisis of major proportions? One can perhaps make 
three assertions for the Ten: that we helped (with others) to hold out ma­
terial incentives to the régime in Warsaw to lift martial law sooner rather 
than later; that we may have helped (again with others) to deter the Soviet 
military intervention for which we now know that plans existed; and that 
we gave some encouragement to the Opposition, and to the population 
generally, at a very difficult time in Polish History.
d) The Falkland Islands 1982
This crisis differs in kind from the others discussed in this section. On the 
one hand, the Argentine invasion affected only one Member State di­
rectly; on the other, it raised very fundamental questions concerning the 
use of force in international relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
self-determination and (some said) colonialism.
The Islands were invaded on 2 April. By the 14th the Ten had issued 
strong statements of condemnation and adopted a package of economic 
measures including a total ban on imports from Argentina (for one 
month, in the first instance)and an embargo on the supply of arms and 
military equipment — this last a decision of no small importance, given 
the use made by Argentina of the French “Exocet” missiles already in her 
possession.
The author has two personal recollections of the Political Committee 
during those April days: first, the heart-warming solidarity expressed by 
all his colleagues without exception, including the representatives of Italy 
and Ireland with their substantial ethnic connexions with Argentina; and 
second, the very clear statements by several of these same colleagues that 
their solidarity did not imply endorsement of the British position on the 
question of sovereignty over the Islands.
This mood lasted for the first month of the crisis, while the British task 
force ploughed its way across the Atlantic, and while efforts continued to 
solve the crisis by diplomatic means. Attitudes changed, especially in 
Dublin and Rome, after the Argentine cmiser General Belgrano was sunk 
on 2 May with loss of life. But while withdrawing from the earlier con­
sensus, Ireland and Italy undertook to ensure that trade with Argentine 
was not diverted to their advantages, and the embargoes were still in 
force when the Argentina forces on the islands surrendered on 14 June. 
(Britain would have liked them to continue until Argentina formally 
ceased hostilities, but this was not agreed.)
In this crisis, exceptional in so many ways, certain points are notable. 
Solidarity with the injured partner prevailed over all other considerations 
among the Ten. Their stance contributed greatly to the diplomatic isola­
tion of Argentina at the U.N. and internationally. Fighting ended before 
the trade embargo could have much effect; but the arms ban was impor­




























































































III. Achievements and failures
This may be a suitable moment at which to draw up a balance-sheet of the 
achievements and failures of EPC in the first dozen years of its existence. 
But before doing so we should remind ourselves that there is more to 
EPC than the high-profile responses generated by situations of crisis. 
Throughout this period, week in and week out, the hard labour of EPC 
continued, though little of it came to the public eye. Foreign Ministers 
met more and more frequently, and with an increasing readiness to com­
bine EPC with EC business if this happened to be convenient. Political 
Directors too saw each other more often than at the stated monthly inter­
vals. Correspondents were in daily liaison by telephone or COREU. 
Working Groups, nearly 20 in number, covered every geographical re­
gion and many important functional fields also. The web of political Dia­
logues with third countries spread steadily wider. At the United Nations, 
in other organisations and at international conferences, close coordination 
among the delegations of the Twelve became the rule. Collaboration be­
tween diplomatic missions of the Member States developed in parallel.
By the mid-1980s, therefore, the positive achievements of EPC could be 
listed as follows:
*  1) EPC had to a substantial extent*‘Europeanised” the foreign policies of 
the Member States. The smaller members had come to see their external 
relations very largely through the prism of EPC, while the Falkland 
episode had shown the European dimension could be valuable even to a 
nuclear power in a localised but important bilateral dispute.
2) The “consultation reflex” had developed to the point where ad hoc con­
sultations were becoming less necessary, simply because partners' views 
were so well known already.
3) The level of knowledge and quality of understanding of world events 
in Foreign Ministries of the Member States had risen generally, the 
smaller members naturally benefitting more than the larger.
4) Special knowledge derived from the involvement of one or more 
Member States in a particular region (e.g. Britain and France in parts of 
Africa, Portugal in Angola and Mozambique, Spain in Central America) 
could be shared with partners through EPC and thus placed at the disposal 
of the Twelve as a whole.
5) At the UN and elsewhere on the international diplomatic stage, the 





























































































6) Solidarity among the Twelve had more than once enabled Member 
States to defend their interests better collectively than they could have 
done individually — for example, in Iran at certain periods of the 
Khomeini regime.
7) EPC articulated the “voice of Europe” in the form of common posi­
tions on almost all international issues of importance.
8) In certain specific situations, e.g. the Polish crisis of 1980-82, the joint 
views of the Member States, synthesised and expressed through EPC, had 
almost certainly helped to influence the course of events.
Against this catalogue of achievements could be set the following list of 
weaknesses:
1) EPC was mainly reactive, triggered into life by any event which af­
fected the interests or caught the attention of the Twelve, but dormant 
otherwise. Statements by the Twelve on international questions, even 
when issued by Heads of State and Government from the ceremonial plat­
form of the European Council, often attracted little interest, the Twelve 
being seen more as commentators on the game than as significant players 
in it.
2) EPC depended on the rule of consensus. This could be a multiple ob­
stacle. Before the Twelve could act, there had to be consensus on the 
facts, on their interpretation, on the appropriate response and also on 
procedures, including such details as timing phraseology. EPC might fall 
at any one of these fences, leaving the Twelve with no choice but to admit 
failure. A single instance of disagreement naturally caught the public eye 
more than a dozen cases where consensus was achieved.
3) EPC was dependent also on the Presidency. Whichever Member held 
this office was expected over six months to maintain not just administra­
tive competence — no small demand on a country with limited resources 
— but also diplomatic skills of a high order. Even more necessary, and 
perhaps easier for smaller than for larger states, was a punctilious sepa­
ration between the Presidency and the national role and interests of its 
current holder. After the incident of September 1983, when a Korean 
airliner was shot down by a Soviet fighter with the loss of 269 lives, it 
was widely felt that a more conscientious Presidency could have achieved 
a quicker and more substantial consensus.
4) EPC was selective. The first Working Groups had been created to deal 
with those areas where the Member States felt their interests to be most 
closely involved. The coverage had been steadily extended, but it was still 




























































































new Working Groups on functional areas of policy such as Terrorism and 
Human Rights. The handling of a case by the Twelve could thus vary 
from comprehensive to perfunctory. More seriously, EPC was debarred 
from discussing “security” except in its political and economic aspects. 
This meant that Disarmament, Arms Control and Confidence Building 
Measures could appear on an EPC agenda, but not (for instance) the 
threat to Western Europe constituted by the SS.20 missile and how to 
counter it.
5) EPC was largely declaratory and lacked “teeth”. In one crisis after an­
other, the Twelve found it easier to decide what to say about the situation 
than what to do about it. When a list of “measure” was announced, it often 
proved to be somewhat hollow. Ambassadors were jointly withdrawn, 
only to straggle untidily back to their posts after a short interval. In the 
economic field it was always hard to identify measures which would hit 
the target without collateral damage (or with only slight damage, and that 
equally shared) to the interests of the Twelve. To some extent these are 
criticisms of the nature of foreign policy itself: if it had “teeth”, Clause- 
vitz would not have needed to describe war as its continuation by other 
means. But even some of EPC’s best friends did ask themselves whether 
the European Community could not more often find some way to bring to 
bear, at least in well-defined cases, its undoubted commercial, economic 
and financial muscle. This leads on to the last criticism.
6) EPC was not sufficiently coordinated with the activity of the EC itself. 
By comparison with the Community, EPC lacked structure. It had no 
Commission charged with the duty to make proposals, no system of ma­
jority voting to stimulate decisions, no executive machinery to carry them 
out, no levers or inducements of its own to back them up. In addition, it 
must be admitted, a certain professional rivalry was allowed to grow up 
between the economic and the political bureaucracies, reinforced by their 
different routines and working styles.
IY. The Single European Act
The deficiencies of EPC, recognized as they were by practitioners and ob­
servers alike, were among the factors which prompted the organizational 
reforms of the mid-1980’s. But the shortcomings of the EC itself attracted 
more attention: for example, the paralysis resulting from abuse of the 
rule of unanimity and the “Luxembourg compromise” of 1966; the persis­
tent failure to bring agricultural spending under control, or to solve the 
problem of the British contribution to the Budget; the exhaustion of the 
EC’s own resources; and the stagnation of negotiations for the entry of 
Spain and Portugal. In the path of reform, the causal line runs clearly 




























































































Declaration at Stuttgart in June 1983, the Draft Treaty of European 
Union inspired by Altiero Spinelli and adopted by the European Parlia­
ment in 1984, the work of the Dooge Committee in 1984 and the Delors 
proposals of January 1985 to the Intergovernmental Conference of 
September 1985 and the Single European Act itself, adopted in February 
1986 and entering into force a year later. Throughout all these docu­
ments, the emphasis was perhaps 10% on improvements in EPC and 90% 
on the reform of the EC itself, a proportion roughly reflected in the text 
of the Single Act.
The SEA nevertheless marked a landmark in the history of EPC. Under 
the heading “Title III — Treaty Provisions on European Cooperation in 
the sphere of Foreign Policy” it contained an Article 30 comprising 12 
paragraphs, supplemented by decisions taken by Foreign Ministers 
extending over 6 more pages and filling in the details.
The effect of the SEA upon EPC was as follows:
1) For the first time, it placed EPC on a Treaty base. Title III of the SEA 
has the same status as the rest of the document, and is equally subject to 
the Preamble and to the provisions of Title IV on Ratification and Entry 
into Forces. The legal base of the EPC is equal, though not identical, to 
that of the EC itself.
2) The SEA consolidated the obligations to consult, to try to reach com­
mon positions and to conduct dialogues as necessary with third countries 
and regional groupings.
3) It confirmed the pattern of consultative meetings at various levels.
4) It reiterated the role of the European Parliament in terms which in 
practice have enabled it to increase its influence.
5) It specified that the aim of EPC is “to formulate and implement a Eu­
ropean foreign policy”.
6) It confirmed that EPC can deal with security in its political and eco­
nomic aspects, and added some lines which make clear the resolve of the 
majority of Member States to coordinate their policies on the military 
aspects in other groupings.
7) It established a Secretariat in Brussels to assist the Presidency.
Can it be said that the weaknesses of EPC, noted above, were corrected by 





























































































Early in 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a “death sentence” against 
Salman Rushdie, author of “The Satanic Verses”. On 20 February the 
Foreign Ministers of the Twelve issued a strong statement of criticism, 
and the Ambassadors of all Member States in Teheran were withdrawn 
for consultations. A month later all except 3 had returned to their posts.
In may 1989 the Chinese authorities suppressed by force the reform 
movement centred on Tainanmen. Strong statements of condemnation 
were issued, first by the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve and then by 
their Heads of Government, accompanied by joint measures including the 
suspension of military cooperation, high level visits and possible credits to 
China from the World Bank.
After the arrival of US troops in Panama in December 1989 an attempt 
was made to agree a joint statement of the Twelve by COREU, but with­
out success, owing to wide differences of view among the Twelve as to 
how the enterprise should be regarded. The statement eventually issued, 
after a discussion between Foreign Ministers, was brief and general in 
nature.
From these and other cases of the period 1987-89 it would be fair to 
conclude that, since the entry into force of the SEA, EPC has continued to 
register roughly the same proportion of successes and failures as before; 
that the successes have not owed much, if anything, to the changes made 
by the SEA; and that the failures are explained by long-standing weak­
nesses in EPC which the SEA did not and could not cure.
V. The Future
With the EC meanwhile advancing rapidly towards completion of the 
Single Internal Market, and also moving into the new areas of policy indi­
cated by the SEA, it is perhaps not surprising that Mr. Delors has com­
plained, in his speeches in the European Parliament in January 1989 and 
again in January 1990, that EPC is “lagging behind”.
If this is true, what measures might be considered which could help to 
correct the situation?
Before answering this question, it should be recalled that the Member 
States appeared to recognize, at the moment they put their signatures to it, 
the fact that Title III of the SEA might well prove inadequate. For para­
graph 12 of Article 30 specifies that “five years after the entry into force 
of this Act the high Contracting parties shall examine whether any revi­
sion of Title III is required”. This review clause, applying only to that 
part of the SEA which deals with EPC, is an invitation to which the re­
maining pages of this essay are an attempt to respond. The suggestions are 




























































































1) It would be relatively easy, first, to stimulate a quantitative expansion 
of EPC. This has in any case been characteristic of its development for 
the entire 20 years of its existence. But to increase the frequency of 
meetings or the number of Working Groups, or the length of commu­
niques, or the range of political Dialogues with third countries, would not 
necessarily be to improve the effectiveness of EPC in the kind of difficult 
cases which attract the most attention.
2) Secondly, the role of the Secretariat could be enlarged, as some Mem­
ber States would have favoured when it was setup. Its Head need not be 
put on a level with the President of the Commission, but could be given a 
larger staff and authorised (for example) to make proposals on his own 
initiative, to represent the Twelve between meetings, and/or at meetings 
to a certain level.
3) The role of the Parliament, similarly, could be extended and developed 
— all the more easily because the wording of the SEA on the association 
of Parliament with EPC is very general and could be re-interpreted sim­
ply through a decision by the Foreign Ministers.
4) Another possible approach would be to increase the pressure for con­
sensus, e.g. by adopting the rule that dissenters must circulate their rea­
sons in writing within say 48 hours; or that Member States finding them­
selves in a minority of three or fewer will not (or not normally, or not 
without important reasons of principle or national interest) press their 
views to the point where consensus is pretended.
A combination of such procedural measure as these, together with a 
more determined effort by both Presidency and Commission to fuse EPC 
and EC in spirit even if not in letter, and with a more generous definition 
of the “political and economic aspects of security” which EPC is already 
empowered to handle, would go some way towards closing the gap, noted 
by Mr. Delors, between the relatively sluggish progress of EPC and the 
much more rapid march of the EC towards the goals of 1992.
Conversely, if EPC does not fill the blank spaces in its coverage, tighten 
its decision-taking procedures and integrate itself more closely into the 
work of the EC, then it is hard to imagine the Community being able to 
play the part in the world at large and especially in Europe, which events 
seem likely to demand of it.
VI. Conclusions
If the kind of evolutionary approach suggested here does not entirely dis­
pose of the charge that EPC is “lagging behind”, it is perhaps because 
some of those who make this accusation have in mind a gap of a much 




























































































supranational unit and EPC in which national mechanisms are still domi­
nant. This gap is symbolised by the difference in numbers between 
roughly 17,000 staff at the Community’s Headquarters and the 17 officials 
who make up the EPC Secretariat.
There is a clear difference between a common foreign policy combin­
ing the 12 national foreign policies and a single European foreign policy 
replacing them. The first is what Member States have worked for steadily 
during the last 20 years, and with some success: the second is perhaps 
what critics hanker after when they call for a stronger European voice in 
the world. A European foreign policy in this latter sense would require 
either one or more new Directorates-General to be added to the Commis­
sion, or a separate European Foreign Ministry to be set up, handling the 
collective foreign policy of the EC as the Commission already handles its 
collective external trade relations. National Foreign Ministries would not 
cease to exist, but their work would be related — and when necessary 
subordinated — to that of the central organ in Brussels, as happens al­
ready in the field of external trade. But to paint a picture of this kind is to 
describe the possible landscape on the far bank of a Rubicon which Mem­
ber States so far have not shown a readiness to cross.
Looking to the future, it seems certain that international relations will 
increasingly come to consist of matters not at present covered by EPC: 
for example, climate and the environment; the management of natural re­
sources; hunger and over-population; and trade, aid and debt. There will 
always need to be a “political” input into the meetings where such things 
are discussed, and if this reaches national Ministers and Heads of Gov­
ernment through other channels than EPC, the resulting policies need not 
be any the less “European” for that. At the same time, the situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe appears likely to call for difficult and far- 
reaching decisions by the West over the next year or two, especially in the 
field of “security” in its widest sense. If the military dimension cannot be 
brought into the EPC agenda, any collective discussions among West Eu­
ropean Governments will have to be organized in other groupings 
(NATO, WEU) or else ad hoc. There is thus a risk that EPC may find it­
self handling, no doubt with ever greater technical perfection, an ever 
smaller proportion of the external relations of the Member States in the 




























































































An East-West Institutional Framework
Michael Palmer
CSCE has come, and nearly gone. But not entirely gone, since follow-up 
conferences have been held and continue to be envisaged. A process exists 
and continues.
Apart from the CSCE process there have been a number of notable 
steps forward in the betterment of East-West relations in Europe. This is 
evident in at least three fields.
In the economic domain Comecon has negotiated a preliminary frame­
work agreement with the EEC from which an increase in East-West trade 
can be expected, following detailed individual sets of negotiations. In se­
curity matters agreement between NATO and Warsaw Pact member 
states on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) has 
helped, even if only marginally, to improve the climate of East-West re­
lations. Action taken by the Soviet Union in the field of human rights 
gives rise to some hope — as do the texts adopted by the CSCE 
participating states in Vienna in January 1989 — that a more positive 
climate might also be achieved, in the coming years, in human rights.
But will the growth of East-West contacts and the improvement of 
East-West relations move fast and positively if they are left to uncoordi­
nated, separate currents of negotiations or meetings? If this were to be so 
we might look for improvements in climate and atmosphere but not nec­
essarily achieve substantive progress and results — certainly not on a 
wide multilateral basis.
At present what are the main forms of East-West contact? Without 
tracing a comprehensive picture of the situation or going into great de­
tail, the main contacts, over and above numerous bilateral political con­
tacts, take two forms: negotiations on trade or security; institutional con­
tacts. In the first category we find the EEC/Comecon relationship, based 
on the framework agreement which remains to be filled out by substan­
tive negotiations between individual Comecon countries and the EEC. In 
this category we also find talks on CSBMs in the CSCE follow-up process 
(here we have an overlap between negotiations and institutionalised con­
tacts); the CFE talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact states in Vienna, 



























































































In the second category we find institutionalised contacts between 35 
states — East and West — in the CSCE follow-up process. We also find 
institutionalised contacts in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 
a UN regional body, and, also, in bodies like the UN and its specialised 
agencies, UNESCO and UNIDO for instance, which operate at the global 
level and include, within a wider framework, both Eastern and Western 
European states. GATT is another instance, though Eastern European 
membership is very limited. At the parliamentary level Eastern and 
Western parliamentarians can meet to exchange views — or polemics — 
within the UN General Assembly or within the Inter-parliamentary 
Union (IPU).
In the Autumn of 1988 a direct East-West contact was established when 
Mr Malinowski, the Marshall of the Sejm, organised a meeting of Presi­
dents of the national parliaments of the CSCE participating countries. 
Consideration is being given to a possible follow-up meeting. In the 
Spring of 1989 the Secretary General of the Hungarian Communist Party 
launched the idea of a meeting between NATO and Warsaw Pact parlia­
mentarians to be held in Budapest. A similar Hungarian proposal is to 
hold a meeting of Eastern and Western politicians in Budapest to discuss 
the philosophy of the “Common European Home”. It seems as if the au­
thorities of the GDR are considering the idea of trying to create some 
kind of Comecon parliamentary body modeled in part on the European 
Parliament. If this were to come into being, it would seem likely that it 
would try to establish links with the European Parliament, which already, 
in effect, has established three parliamentary delegations charged with 
contacting parliamentarians from: the USSR, the Northern and the South­
ern Comecon countries.
If we were to consider it useful to explore ways of moving beyond the 
first, existing approach towards a more schematic and more consciously 
organised system of East-West relations what could be the main options?
One approach — the second suggested in this lecture — could be to 
rely basically on existing machinery, such as the UN’s Economic Com­
mission for Europe, the Council of Europe, the EEC, Comecon et al, de­
ciding in the ministerial governing bodies of the organisations to mandate 
such organisations to give increased prominence to the intensification of 
East-West links. Indeed, the Council of Europe, in its Committee of 
Ministers, has recently decided to do this.
An approach of this kind has certain advantages: by relying on existing 
organisations it saves the considerable expense of creating a new interna­
tional organisation. It also provides flexibility, since it allows Western 
and Eastern governments to move ahead to agreements and cooperative 
projects at an unforced pace in the framework of their choice, without 
their feeling obliged to go further or faster than they wish across the 
board.
But this approach has a number of drawbacks. First, most of the organ­




























































































tacts are Western organisations, based on Western political, social and 
economic ideas. Thus, although it might be tempting to see the Council of 
Europe providing part of a “Common European Home”, and although 
Hungary, for instance, might possibly find that it could accept some kind 
of membership of the Council of Europe, it is not very easy to see Ro­
mania or Czechoslovakia as any kind of member of the Council of Eu­
rope at present. Further, it is hardly likely that, even to advance the cause 
of better East-West relations, any Western European country would seek 
membership of the Warsaw Pact or Comecon!
In the important defence area, although direct negotiations between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be envisaged, and although the CFE 
talks already engage their member governments in negotiations, it is dif­
ficult to imagine East-West security talks taking place inside NATO or 
the Warsaw Pact.
In his book Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev has stressed that to him, at 
any rate, a “Common European Home” can only be built if neither East 
nor West tries to impose its own philosophy on the other. Of course, 
Western attempts to intensify and improve East-West relations do not 
have to conform to Mr Gorbachev’s vision. But Mr Gorbachev is the 
main person with whom we have to do business in the East, and it would 
seem foolish to ignore his views or to try to circumvent them without 
good reason.
Another major drawback to the use-of-existing-institutions-approach is 
the difficulty, both for Western and for Eastern governments, of coordi­
nating their policies and negotiations in the different frameworks that 
might be involved, and these could be numerous if agreements and joint 
action were to be sought in a wide number of technical domains, such as 
air traffic control, transport, postage, telecommunications, scientific re­
search, etc. Could, for instance, the Twelve use the EEC or, more par­
ticularly, EPC, to concert its aims and tactics covering a wide range of 
subjects? In any event, countries like Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Austria would be left out of concertation by the Twelve.
An alternative system of coordination might be sought on the basis of a 
small, skeleton secretariat, made up of officials from the main protago­
nists in the East-West process (notably the 35 CSCE participant states), 
which could coordinate and monitor the progress of individual sets of 
East-West negotiations, initiatives taken and agreements reached in the 
framework of the Council of Europe, ECE or whatever body concerned. 
The aim here would be to achieve a more ambitious type of coordination 
which would itself be on an East-West basis. Such a process would not 
exclude separate preparatory coordinating work by the West or East.
Finally, this approach would seem to suffer from a lack of centrality, 
impetus and drive. For those who consider it enough to leave the im­
provement of East-West relations to a process of natural drift, or who 
are content to pay lip-service to it, this could well be an advantage. But 




























































































board, whether in Mr Gorbachev’s still barely defined “Common Euro­
pean Home” or in a different framework, such an approach is inadequate.
At this point it might be useful to comment briefly on Mikhail Gor­
bachev’s “Common European Home”. Mr Gorbachev devotes an impor­
tant section of his book Perestroika to this idea. But study of the book re­
veals little in the way of specific proposals as to the form Mr Gorbachev 
might wish the “Common European Home” to take. It is, as yet, more a 
declaration of intent, a phrase, rather than a defined idea. Further, inter­
esting and exciting as this declaration of intent may be, it is accompanied 
by certain comments that will not be universally welcomed in the West. 
For instance, we are told that the division of Germany into two parts is 
definitive and permanent. We are also told that tactical nuclear weapons 
must be eliminated in Europe. But most of the remarks in this key part of 
Mr Gorbachev’s book are constructive and uncontroversial. He stresses 
the need to find a mutually advantageous form of cooperation. He speaks 
of the need for the whole of Europe to make a contribution to the North- 
South dialogue. As far as pan-European cooperation is concerned, Mr 
Gorbachev proposes the creation of joint business projects, the establish­
ment of joint East-West development projects in third world countries, 
technological cooperation, cooperation in the use of thermonuclear en- 
ergy, joint space research and joint research in biotechnology. Above all, 
great stress is laid on cooperation in the field of human rights.
Very little is said as to the structure of a “Common European Home”, 
but it is emphasised that although the Home is “common”, “each family 
has its own apartment” in the Home, which, also, has different entrances!
This vagueness concerning structure is perhaps an advantage, since it 
offers others, notably the Twelve and other governments, the opportunity 
of putting forward precise proposals for an institutional framework 
which they themselves would like to see constructed -— the Gorbachev 
proposal is an open-ended one, holding out a wide range of possibilities 
without being exclusive. It is, in effect, an offer that can be examined by 
political leaders in Eastern and Western Europe and argued and negoti­
ated into a mutually acceptable shape. Mikhai'1 Gorbachev’s “Common 
European Home” might thus lead us on to a third approach.
This third approach would be to move beyond the present “non-system” 
of separate, uncoordinated sets of contacts and negotiations, or a more 
schematic and consciously organised version of such contacts, to a more 
ambitious and formal attempt to institutionalise East-West relations in 
Europe through the creation of a standing East-West body.
As early as June 1970 at its Budapest meeting, the Warsaw Pact pro­
posed the establishment of a “permanent organ” as one of three agenda 
items for an eventual CSCE. On its side, the North Atlantic Council ten­
tatively suggested at its Rome meeting of May 1970 that “the establish­
ment of a permanent body could be envisaged as one means, among 
others, of embarking upon multilateral negotiations”. At that early stage 




























































































creation of an institution to prepare a CSCE, possibly to act as a setting 
for it, and possibly to follow up decisions taken at such a conference.
In the event, NATO cooled toward the idea of a “permanent organ” and 
the emphasis placed by NATO member states on human rights during 
CSCE, when it was held at Helsinki, led the Warsaw Pact members, in 
their turn, to shy away from the proposal, without formally dropping it.
Following the Helsinki conference, and for a period of some years, the 
rather chilly nature of the East-West relationship, although slightly im­
proved by a number of individual agreements, such as those concerning 
CSBMs, did not provide a fruitful setting for the creation of a 
“permanent organ”.
However, since the advent to power of Mr Gorbachev in the USSR, the 
policy of the Soviet Union towards the West has moved far and fast as far 
as arms control negotiations and contacts with the EEC are concerned. 
This major shift in Soviet policy has led to a degree of movement in some 
policies of some of the Warsaw Pact or Comecon allies.
The next part of this lecture examines how, in this climate, and re­
sponding to the challenge of Mr Gorbachev’s “Common European 
Home”, the establishment of some form of East-West standing institution 
might help to build a permanent East-West dialogue, providing continuity 
and leading, it is to be hoped, to active cooperation over projects of mu­
tual interest in a number of fields. It will also explore the possible mem­
bership, mandate, structure and working of a standing East-West body. It 
will suggest that such an institution might provide the infrastructure for 
continuing East-West dialogue on a range of issues with a bearing on se­
curity in Europe. It is recognised that the establishment of such a body 
and its procedures would not in itself provide the answers to the outstand­
ing problems of East-West relations, but it is to be hoped that it would 
stimulate mutual understanding, reduce tensions, and provide a lead in the 
search for an improved European security system.
It is held that the Western interest is to try to replace confrontation by 
a network of cooperative contacts aimed at increasing mutual confidence 
and, where possible, creating joint interests. With this aim in view, it 
would seem to be in the interest of EEC and other Western states to de­
velop and intensify economic, commercial and other contacts with the 
Warsaw Pact/Comecon countries as far as possible, whilst ensuring that 
this process does not endanger, put in question or inhibit the democratic 
character and practices of Western European states, the rule of law and 
the guarantees of human rights in these states, and the military security of 
Western Europe.
The pursuit of these aims in no way contradicts the need to maintain the 
defence of Western Europe, though it is to be hoped that levels of mili­
tary manpower and all types of weapons in Eastern and Western Europe 
can be negotiated downwards resulting in a balanced East-West situation.
It is suggested that new approaches to European security might be ex­




























































































but the possible re-examination by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact of 
strategic and tactical doctrine. For instance, might not NATO reconsider, 
before it is completely put into place, the doctrine of Follow On Forces 
Attack (FOFA) which seems at best workable only with great difficulty 
and expense, and also to be potentially destabilising and provocative? In 
exchange the West might persuade the Warsaw Pact that some tactical 
nuclear weapons (even modernised ones) enhance all-European security 
by providing a deterrent and escalatory step between conventional and 
all-out strategic nuclear war.
Other security matters that could be explored include: the acceptance 
by both pacts of purely defensive strategic doctrines; a nuclear-free cor­
ridor dividing Eastern from Western Europe; etc.
It is held that the creation of an East-West institution might provide a 
suitable framework within which aims of this kind could be developed 
and realised.
It is suggested that the most useful form of standing institution would 
be, basically, some kind of permanent secretariat that would provide 
continuity in preparing and servicing regular meetings of members of the 
NATO, Warsaw Pact, and “European” neutral and non-aligned countries, 
as detailed later.
It could be argued that an East-West body might be set up under the 
auspices of the UN. This has, indeed, been suggested by Mr Ceausescu, in 
the past. But there is at least one reason why a UN link could be a draw­
back. A regional organ of the UN dealing with security issues could fall 
foul of vetoes expressed in the Security Council. Still in the UN context, 
it has been suggested that an East-West body might include among its or­
gans a regional juridicial mechanism for the peaceful settlement of dis­
putes under Articles 52-54 of the UN Charter.
In view of the self-confidence and self-awareness as “Europeans” of 
many European countries, notably members of the European Commu­
nity, there are likely to be pressures for an autonomous body independent 
of UN control.
Participation. Which countries might take part in an East-West Com­
mission? Before the holding of CSCE there was, until the Budapest 
meeting of the Warsaw Pact in June 1970, some ambiguity about partici­
pation in CSCE itself, let alone in an eventual standing body. In particu­
lar, a question mark was placed by the Eastern European countries 
against the presence of the US and Canada. The US and Canada have 
taken part in the whole of the CSCE process, and it now seems clear that 
no objection would be raised to their participation in a CSCE-related 
East-West body by the East. The West argued that US and Canadian pres­
ence in CSCE was necessary to balance that of the Soviet Union. Follow­
ing CSCE — even bearing in mind that the CFE (Conventional Forces in 
Europe) negotiations exclude the non-NATO and non-Warsaw Pact 
countries — it would seem logical that membership of a standing com­




























































































might be members, including the US and Canada, though Mr Gorbachev 
is rather ambiguous about American and Canadian participation in the 
“Common European Home” in his book.
What Form or Forms Might an East-West 
Commission Take?
The reply to this question could be a sliding scale, and would depend on 
the will of the participating states. At the low end of the scale —  the 
minimalist one, and reverting to the second proposal — we could envis­
age a ministerial body, meeting for a few days once or twice a year, with 
a skeleton staff, trying to coordinate and give a harmonious sense of di­
rection to ongoing sets of East-West contacts, processes or negotiations 
— such as EEC/Comecon negotiations, East-West arms control negotia­
tions, the CSCE follow-up process, etc.
At the upper end of the scale we could imagine a body, representing the 
wish of participating governments, to set in motion a motor to make seri­
ous and continuing attempts to improve relations between European 
states. This body might be distinct, formally, from the CSCE process. 
Alternatively, it could, quite simply, institutionalise the CSCE process, 
transforming it from a process into an institution. It is held, in effect, that 
the experience of the CSCE process has been sufficiently positive to jus­
tify such transformation. It is also held that such a transformation should 
be achieved as soon as possible so as to provide an appropriate institu­
tional framework for the rapidly developing East-West scene. To act in 
this way would both provide a consummation of the present CSCE pro­
cess, and the birth of a new form of CSCE. The institutionalisation of the 
CSCE process would provide an opportunity for broadening out the 
traditional subject areas of CSCE to cover a wider range of matters. The 
institutionalisation of CSCE would also provide, in itself, the solution of 
the problem of participation in an East-West body. In view of such an 
institutional framework, a strong central secretariat would be required. 
Would the staff be made up of national civil servants on detachment or 
other nominees of participating countries, or would it be an indepen­
dently recruited international secretariat such as that of the Community 
or Western intergovernmental institutions?
A Ministerial Council, meeting perhaps twice a year and chaired by 
participating countries in rotation, would seem to be an appropriate gov­
erning body of an East-West Commission. In view of the sensitivity of 
many of the issues to be dealt with, the decisions and procedures of such a 
Commission would seem likely to be governed by the unanimity rule or 
arrived at by consensus — if, indeed, a commission were empowered to 
take substantive decisions and was not merely restricted to the transmis­
sion of recommendations to member governments.
A system of permanent representatives, or ambassadors, backed up by 




























































































tween ministerial sessions of the governing body, would seem to be a use­
ful feature of such a body in the light of the experience of such organisa­
tions as NATO, OECD and the Council of Europe in the West.
In view of the importance of educating public opinion about and in­
volving it in the betterment of East-West relations in Europe, the direct 
participation of parliamentarians in the work of a commission might be 
useful. In this case, one of the institutions of a commission could be a 
parliamentary assembly. Amongst its functions, such an assembly could 
debate annual reports from the ministerial council or other governing 
body and could take initiatives in the form of recommendations or reso­
lutions addressed to this body, to which it might also table questions for 
oral or written reply.
The main substantive work of an East-West commission could be dele­
gated to a number of committees of governmental experts which would 
meet regularly and report back to the commission itself. One could 
imagine a series of committees on the subject areas which most obviously 
come to mind, including: (a) Committee on European security; (b) 
Committee on trade, and economic and monetary problems; (c) Commit­
tee on human rights; (d) Committee on European environmental prob­
lems; (e) Committee on scientific and technological cooperation; (f) 
Transport Committee; (g) Committee on cultural contacts; (h) Legal 
Committee. As already noted, this group of subjects is wider than those 
dealt with up to now in CSCE.
Further committees could be created as appropriate, covering, for in­
stance, energy or agriculture or development aid, as subject areas took on 
greater importance in the developing East-West relationship.
As far as arms control inspection is concerned, an East-West agency 
for the control of armaments might be set up as one of the commission’s 
organs. In this respect it could be useful to draw, in one way or another, 
on the experience of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments in 
Paris. The related but distinct problem of trying to control arms exports 
could be referred to the Committee on European Security.
It is interesting to note that before the holding of the first Helsinki 
CSCE, Professor Alting von Geusau saw the necessity for a “standing 
regional conference with a permanent secretariat” as being greater than 
that for a single conference or even a series of conferences.
If an East-West commission were to be set up, where should it be lo­
cated? Helsinki and Vienna immediately come to mind as prospective 
seats for a “permanent organ” as being capitals of neutral countries that 
lie geographically between the blocs. Geneva would also be in a good 
position to host an East-West commission, as the major UN centre in Eu­
rope. Stockholm, another neutral capital, might also be a possibility. If 
the commission did not necessarily have to be located in a neutral state, 
Berlin — East and West — might divide up the institutions and organs of 




























































































The structure of an East-West commission could look like this:
E ut-W N t Commission
So much for structure, subject-matter and location. But what as to the 
substantive work that might be done in a standing commission? Would 
such a commission have real possibilities of achieving worthwhile results 
in one or other of the subject-areas indicated, especially in view of actual 
or probable East-West bilateral negotiations and contacts? The CFE ne­
gotiations, the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons, the EEC/Come- 
con framework agreement all provide important instances of ongoing 
processes. Might not an East-West commission merely complicate, in an 
expensive way, what is better done elsewhere? Might not the freedom of 
policy-making and of negotiations of the European Community and its 
Commission, or that of the NATO allies, be restricted or infringed by the 
operation of a new East-West body? Might not the integrity and character 
of the Community and the Alliance be adversely affected?
To start with subject-areas. In an improving East-West climate there is 
no shortage of topics on which East-West negotiations could result in 
mutually profitable results; the improvement of East-West air, road, rail 
and water transport connections; the conclusion of agreements on 
environmental protection; the development of cooperation on agricultural 
production and sales; the use of energy are just some instances of the 
more practical day-to-day issues that could be subject to multilateral 





























































































tangible, but perhaps even more important matters could include 
.an rights, the freer movement of people and the reunification of
nilies across national and East-West borders, and, above all, the con­
sideration of the central problems of “European security” which, for the 
West, must necessarily include the problems of a divided Berlin and a 
divided Germany.
On this point, Mikhail Gorbachev’s “Perestroika” does not hold out 
great hopes; “Peu importe ce que Ronald Reagan et d’autres dirigeants 
occidentaux peuvent dire en l ’occurrence, ils sont incapables d’offrir la 
moindre proposition réaliste à la RFA pour résoudre le prétendu 
problème allemand. Ce qui s’est formé historiquement, mieux vaut le 
laisser à l’histoire. C’est également vrai du destin de la nation allemande 
et des formes de l’Etat allemand”.
Continuing on this warning note, Mikhaïl Gorbachev comments: “Il y a 
deux Etats allemands dotés de systèmes politiques et sociaux différents. 
Chacun d’eux a ses valeurs propres. L’un et l’autre ont tiré des leçons de 
l ’histoire, et chacun peut contribuer aux affaires de l ’Europe et du 
monde. Et quant à ce qu’il adviendra dans cent ans d ’ici, laissons 
l ’histoire en décider. Pour l’heure, il convient de se fonder sur les réalités 
existantes et ne pas se lancer dans des spéculations effrénées”. Mr 
Gorbachev’s words are at least refreshingly free of hypocrisy, and are, 
perhaps, realistic, as far as international opinion is concerned. But is 
there, perhaps, a lack of consistency or even a degree of contradiction 
between this comment — stressing as it does the difficulty of bridging 
different political and social systems — and the underlying idea of the 
Common European Home, which is surely the development of mutual 
interests across ideological and social differences?
This thought leads to some further reflections on Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
“Common European Home” — these perhaps a little more critical. In his 
book and public statements, Mr Gorbachev has, very cleverly, made the 
most of the things that link, or might link, the potential inhabitants of the 
different apartments in his “Home”. He has also gone to some lengths to 
emphasise cultural differences between North America and Europe, 
pointing the finger at the USA as being a purveyor of violence and 
pornography.
Both the “commonalty” of interest between Eastern and Western 
Europe and the differences between Europe and North America are exag­
gerated by Mr Gorbachev. He minimises, in general terms, those 
ideological, political, social and economic differences that have divided 
the two halves of Europe since the second world war. He seems to forget, 
also, or to minimise, the role played by Canada and the USA in helping to 
defect fascism and bringing peace to Europe in 1945.
Whilst admiring the boldness and enthusiasm with which Mr 
Gorbachev uses primary colours in making his proposals look attractive, 
I wish to point to the need for Western opinion to realise that the 




























































































since the creation of NATO 40 years ago, much more significant than any 
degree of film or video violence and pornography originating in the USA 
which, by the way, has no monopoly in peddling brutality and vice. 
Likewise, Western opinion should be encouraged to realise that, as yet, 
and this goes even for the more liberal Eastern European régimes, life 
lived in what would be the Eastern “apartments” in the “Common 
European Home” is very different from life as lived by those who would 
live in the Western “apartment”. Mikhail Gorbachev’s own arguments, 
expressed in his book, point to the impossibility, in the immediate future, 
of uniting the West German and East German “apartments”. Perhaps 
there is a warning in this for any who wish to follow Mikhail Gor­
bachev’s ideas as he has presented them, without question.
Indeed, in reacting to the idea of separate apartments in the European 
Home we might do well to stress the need for the Twelve to occupy a 
distinct and separate group of apartments in the Home that they would 
own as a collectivity, like a condominium in a housing estate, rather than 
living in isolated separate apartments. In effect, does not Mikhail Gor­
bachev’s phrase, a “Common European Home” — reassuringly close as it 
is to the phrase “Common Market” — beg a number of questions?
One of the questions is the Atlantic dimension. The Western European 
states which are members of the Atlantic Alliance already belong to an 
“Atlantic Home”. How, in Mr Gorbachev’s vision, would the European 
and Atlantic Home be fitted together? Or would the Atlantic Home have 
to be pulled down to make way for the Common European Home? If Mr 
Gorbachev were to insist on this second eventuality, many in the West 
would certainly prefer to maintain the present system of East-West rela­
tions, imperfect as it is, and with all its divisions, rather than dismantle 
the Atlantic Alliance as a pre-condition for the establishment of a new 
and untried East-West organisation.
Even more pertinent than the Atlantic Home, as far as the Twelve are 
concerned, is that they already live in their own European Home, which 
they have built up and enlarged with great effort over the years. The 
twelve members of the European Community will certainly insist on 
continuing to live in this house and on being able to improve it or make it 
larger, as they choose, even if they agree to live in close proximity with 
others.
Another question, referring to Mr Gorbachev’s meaning of the word 
“European”, and reverting to membership of an East-West body, is how 
far will the nationalist aspirations of some comparatively recently an­
nexed parts of the Soviet Union be compatible with their representation 
in a “Common European Home” by the Soviet Government? Will the 
three former Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, be allowed to 
have their own separate apartments in the Home?
However, hesitations, questions and criticisms of this kind should not 
lead us to reject Mr Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home” 




























































































phrase, rather than a polished idea. It is susceptible to development, ne­
gotiation and adaptation. The Western powers did not, initially, welcome 
the original proposals made by the Warsaw Pact, concerning the holding 
of a CSCE. But they took those proposals, thrashed them out with the 
Warsaw Pact and from this confrontation of ideas the Helsinki Confer­
ence and the CSCE process were bom.
In like manner, the Twelve and other Western governments could take 
the “Common European Home” as a starting point and come forward 
with their own proposals, and then negotiate them with the East into a 
mutually acceptable alternative, possibly along the lines already indicated 
in this lecture. In the end we might emerge with something that is not 
necessarily “common”, not necessarily “European” and not necessarily a 
“house containing apartments”, but which is mutually acceptable and use­
ful to East and West.
Whilst neither East nor West are probably collectively ready, as yet, to 
think in terms of dismantling their military Alliances, which have pro­
vided Europe with security stability for 40 years, they could perhaps start 
to think how the two Alliances might increasingly explore new types of 
inter-Alliance relationships of a cooperative rather than confrontational 
nature.
It is held that negotiations on the subject-areas suggested above in a 
permanent multilateral framework, would not duplicate or complicate but 
add to the type of progress that might be made in the separate sets of on­
going negotiations.
It is also held that talks and negotiations within a common framework 
would be given encouragement and support by the very mutuality of this 
framework itself, with a concomitant reduction of emphasis on the tradi­
tionally confrontational East-West bargaining postures.
Whilst it would seem inappropriate for the European Community to 
replace its individual member states and to negotiate and act for them in 
an East-West Commission, as it does in GATT, there is a clear interest on 
the part of the Twelve that the European Community should be able to 
play a major part, as such, in the work of an East-West commission.
In a cooperative East-West framework there should also be an interest 
of Eastern participants that the Community should be represented, since 
they are turning increasingly towards the Community as their main West­
ern interlocutor. The commission might most appropriately represent the 
Community as an observer, as it does in OECD. Its most vital task would 
be to coordinate the attitudes of its national governments so that the 
Twelve would act together in taking or reacting to initiatives. It is hoped 
that it would be able to play a full and useful role in most of the organs 
and activities of an East-West body, though the part it could play in the 
security activities of such a body might be difficult to define.
While the European Community continues to be the main forum in 
which Western Europe expresses its “unity”, and while it continues to act 




























































































reason to fear that its integrity would be adversely effected as such by 
participation in an East-West body. However, participation by a Western 
state or by the Community in an East-West body implies some degree of 
willingness to be attentive and, indeed, responsive to the views and needs 
of the Eastern participants, otherwise there would be little or no point in 
becoming involved in an East-West comparative venture at all.
As for complicating or duplicating negotiations or contacts in other 
fora, the main reason for creating an East-West commission at all would 
be for it to stimulate and provide the basis for a continuing political pro­
cess, embracing all the main areas of East-West relations. Specific sets of 
negotiations, such as CFE or EEC/Comecon talks, could be seen as fitting 
into the broader framework of the East-West commission without the di­
rect intervention of the commission or its organs. An East-West commis­
sion should be able to complement and enrich the spasmodic and isolated 
steps achieved in separate ongoing or future negotiations. In effect the 
creation of an East-West commission would be a commitment by the gov­
ernments concerned to work continuously, in an organised way, to 
achieve a less confrontational and more cooperative East-West relation­
ship across the board.
The member governments of the European Community are magnetised 
by “1992”. The single market should make the Community yet wealthier 
and more competitive, and it should result in the reduction of unemploy­
ment and the creation of new jobs. Greater prosperity is an aim that, ac­
companied by suitable social and environmental trimmings, is evidently 
attractive to all the major political and social forces within the Commu­
nity. Indeed it is the economic strength of the Community, together with 
its political stability, that makes it such a compelling force of attraction to 
other European, both Western and Eastern, non-member countries. But 
there is a danger that healthy prosperity could become soured into 
selfishness and greed, turning the admiration of the outside world for the 
Community into jealousy or even hatred.
Two ways — certainly not the only ones — of avoiding the greed trap 
are, first, for the Community to make a more determined effort than in 
the past to aid the ACP and other developing countries. But that is not my 
subject. The second way is for the Community and its member states to 
seek to convert the better “atmospherics” of East-West relations into a 
continuing and organised process of change centred on an East-West in­
stitution as outlined in this lecture, and which might, in part, or might 
not, correspond to Mr Gorbachev’s “Common European Home” — de­
pending on how this vision is defined in more precise detail by Mr Gor­
bachev and others in the future. It is in ways of this kind that modem 






















































































































































































The Past as Future:
Towards a European Defense Community
Christoph Bertram
In his memoirs Jean Monnet writes: “La Communauté elle-même n ’est 
qu’une étape vers les formes d’organisation du monde de demain”. Is se­
curity and defence, in and for Western Europe, the substance that re­
quires new forms of organization? I think the answer is yes. Will it be a 
European Defence Community? I hope so. But will the military aspects of 
security be automatically the next step to European integration? I think 
not; instead, West European governments will have to make a conscious, 
deliberate move in that direction.
Of course there are many who hope otherwise. There is a widespread 
belief among those who want the Community to succeed as a nucleus of a 
European Union, that somehow we might be moving towards a degree of 
political integration which in the end would not just be a big market but 
also would allow us to find new forms of European cooperation in de­
fence and security. But this hope — that somehow because we are form­
ing a market we will do other things as well — is a profound and tradi­
tional illusion of Europeanists. The big market will, more probably, gen­
erate the reaction of the nation-states; it will not necessarily work as a 
catalyst for union. It may, unless firmly put in a political context, even act 
as a catalyst for disunion: either because we will start to find out that 
when we have the big market there is nothing else to do — why do any­
thing more when the market functions? — or because the need for pro­
tection against the pressures of competition and change will once again 
bring the nation-state, national governments, national parliaments, na­
tional lobbies to the fore.
And yet there are profound reasons for Western Europe to think about 
the future organization of its security. There is, for one, the passage of 
time: the North Atlantic Treaty and its organization NATO have provided 
security for forty years, but forty years is a very long time in history. 
Clearly, strains are becoming visible in the Western Alliance. The idea 
that it can simply continue as it has done in the past is rather naïve. Sec­
ondly, we have a changed world situation. The old threat is receding; 



























































































course, continue to have to live with a Soviet superpower. There will not 
just be sweet harmony and light in East-West relations or in the relations 
between Western Europe and that Soviet superpower. But there has been 
profound change in Soviet thinking. The Soviet Union is no longer a 
power which defines its security at the expense of others. Thirdly the 
Community has acquired weight and with it, responsibility, whether it 
likes it or not. Indeed, in the new environment, where military aspects of 
security recede and the general danger of instability around Western Eu­
rope becomes the more obvious security problem, the Community also is 
holding the instruments to cope with some of these instabilities, by the 
very attraction of its market, by the impact of its policies on those around 
it. In short, the European Community today is in the unique position both 
of needing international stability because it is an actor depending on in­
ternational peace, and of having instruments available to contribute to 
stability beyond its own borders. That may be, today, its most serious se­
curity task, to which I will return later.
What about the other, more traditional arm of defence cooperation 
proper? The theme is not new. It has been with us for over thirty years. 
And yet the productivity rate for European defence cooperation has been 
dismal. There is not much to show for except a few abbreviations the 
meaning of which is generally obscure to the larger public: the Indepen­
dent European Programme Group, the West European Union, the Euro 
Group, EPC (European Political Cooperation in foreign affairs) and last, 
by no means least, the Franco-German Brigade. Functional cooperation 
among West European countries in defence simply has not happened. 
There must be a reason for it and I suggest that there are probably two.
The first is that functional reasons are rarely sufficient for functional 
cooperation. It is of course the old belief of European integrationists that 
somehow European reason will triumph if functional reason demands it. 
But that is an error which gains no new conviction by having been re­
peated so often. The modem state simply disposes of too many escape 
routes from the European logic. The consequences of not moving further 
down the road to defence cooperation among West European states have 
never been disastrous, only unpleasant and costly. The functional argu­
ment assumes a higher logic which it does not provide itself. This logic, 
therefore, has to be provided for by a conscious political act. That will 
not emerge from the functionalist approach. To quote Jean Monnet again, 
in this rather sad ending of his book, “Ai-je assez fait comprendre que la 
Communauté que nous avons créée n’a pas son but en elle-même?” The 
Coal and Steel Community would not have come about for the sake of 
coal and steel; there is a nice aside in Monnet’s Memoirs where he says, 
“We didn’t need to consult specialists on coal and steel to bring that about, 
we did not need them. That was not the purpose.” And so European de­
fence cooperation will not come about for the sake of defence coopera­





























































































The second reason for failure, and for not formulating this political 
objective, has been the very structure of Western defence and security 
over the past decades. It has been — by definition and by necessity — an 
Atlantic structure. But that is inevitably a hierarchical structure. Not, as 
some revisionists want us to believe, because the United States is by nature 
an imperial power and the only way to have an alliance with America is 
to accept American dominance, but because nuclear deterrence is by def­
inition hierarchical. There can be no credibility to nuclear deterrence un­
less there is one man, the most powerful man in this alliance, who re­
serves the decision for releasing these fearful forces. Hence, for the mo­
tive of West European defence cooperation to become serious, it would be 
necessary to accept less alliance and less security in the traditional sense, 
i.e. less dependence on nuclear deterrence. Of course, there are pressures 
in all West European countries theoretically demanding more defence in­
tegration. But in the absence of a clear European political objective, the 
solutions that the states will seek will not be West European solutions. 
What is necessary to change this is a political prise de conscience in West­
ern Europe that the security dividends of political unity are higher than 
those of maintaining intact the existing NATO framework. In other 
words, it would require a new look at the total situation.
What I mean is something similar to what Jean Monnet wrote in the 
summer of 1950 — a few months after the Schuman Plan initiative and 
weeks after the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, and the early 
conception of what then became the European Defence Community pro­
ject: “A aucun moment aucune décision d’ensemble n ’aura été prise depuis 
qu’on ait arrêté, voici trois ans, les notions de guerre froide et de con­
tainment, sur lesquelles nous vivons. Lorsque ces notions ont été arrêtées, 
elles avaient en vue le maintien de la paix, mais leur application a entraîné 
une série de décisions imposées par le déroulement des faits: chacune 
prise pour elle-même, chacune s’ajoutant aux décisions antérieures sans 
que jamais une vue nouvelle d’ensemble ne soit prise.”
I
Is such a vue nouvelle d’ensemble possible today? I believe so. We in the 
West agonize again and again over how to help Gorbachev and that is 
only right and proper. As a result of the changes in the Soviet Union, for 
the first time in forty years we can consider risking a bit of Atlantic se­
curity for the sake of gaining closer European political union, relying less 
on nuclear deterrence for the sake of gaining what will inevitably be an 
imperfect, embryonic cooperation in security and defence. The strictures 
of the Cold War and of containment, which have bred, logically and 
inevitably, a host of decisions “imposées par le déroulement des faits”, no 
longer fully determine our security situation. The question is: will West 
European governments and their publics make use of the opportunities 




























































































Although a common foreign and security policy is on the agenda of the 
government conference on Political Union currently taking place, it is un­
likely that the members States will move beyond very general agreements. 
Past mind-sets are too powerful and the ability of Western Europe to look 
after its own military security is, after all, not the most pressing issue to­
day. States group together either because they have no other choice in the 
face of a major threat or because they can undertake new and exciting 
things together. Military defence for most West Europeans today is nei­
ther one nor the other.
The military situation in Europe has changed profoundly over the past 
two years. Then, Soviet forces were still massively deployed in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany; now they are withdrawing 
behind Soviet borders. Then East Germany was the linch-pin of the So­
viet-controlled Warsaw Pact; now that Pact’s military organization has 
been dissolved and East Germany is not only a part of a united Germany 
but part of the Western Alliance. Then it seemed naive to expect that the 
Soviet undertaking to cut all military asymmetries in Europe to a com­
mon level would be honoured; now the Soviet Union has signed, if not 
ratified, the comprehensive Treaty establishing common ceilings on major 
conventional weaponry in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
The big question, of course, is whether that fundamental change could 
be reserved. Has the point of no return been reached?
In politics, there probably never is a defined point of no return, as 
events in China two years ago have painfully and bloodily demonstrated. 
Is Soviet policy reversible? In theory yes, in practice, I think not. One can 
imagine a rapid failure of the present line of policy, the re-emergence of 
a hard-line leadership with hard-line representatives from the military, 
the KGB or the party trying to smother again the new sense of debate and 
freedom, pushing the country on a rough road of economic restructuring 
with the old method of repression rather than the new method of incen­
tive. But there are now an increasing number of vested interests against 
turning back. There is the vested interest of the intelligentsia which in the 
Soviet Union has a greater authority than it would have in many Western 
countries. There is the vested interest now also of the Republics of not 
going back under the old centralized yoke. There is the vested interest of 
the new managerial classes: the Soviet Union has a highly educated élite, 
well-trained people who want to show what they can do. And the armed 
forces, too, have a vested interest not to go back. The Red Army has be­
come a huge machinery that can no longer really function. It is unpre­
pared to cope flexibly with situations of internal conflict. It has an under­
trained corps of non-commissioned officers and junior officers. It is inca­
pable of incorporating modem techniques of warfare which the West has 
been developing rapidly; and because it is so big, it is also hugely costly 





























































































What Mr. Gorbachev has done, is to appeal to the military to trim the 
armed forces down to a size which makes better military sense. They 
were prepared for such suggestions. After all, the debate in the Soviet 
Union on a more defensive structure is older than Mr. Gorbachev; the 
concern of what happens in the non-nuclear field of military activity also 
preceded him. So far, the military support Gorbachev because they see in 
reforms of the economy the only chance for not falling behind tech­
nologically.
So there are a host of vested interests which all suggest that a funda­
mental reversal of Soviet policy is highly unlikely. There will be a trim­
ming of the sails. Some of the more ambitious projects will be cut back. 
We are going to see stretching, we are going to see delays and even back­
sliding. But I do not think we’re going to see a U-tum.
For these very reasons, the Soviet old military threat, the assumed abil­
ity of the Soviet Union to neutralize NATO’s nuclear weapons and to 
rapidly occupy large parts of NATO territory, is a matter of the past. The 
relevance of the military instrument for security is on the decline. Of 
course it will retain some relevance. It will remain necessary to maintain 
an element of nuclear deterrence, even as conventional forces are being 
cut, since nuclear weapons have on the whole had a beneficial, sobering 
impact on the East-West relationship.
But the fact that our military security is less threatened today, does not 
mean that our security problem as such is solved. We will have to think 
about security increasingly in terms of international order, threatened less 
by the deliberate action of a major state to plan military victory over its 
neighbours than by that older cause for conflict: things getting out of 
hand, countries drifting into conflict because the chance for an early 
avoidance of conflict has been missed -  a feature the Gulf conflict has 
once again underlined. We are fortunate that major military conflict is 
highly unlikely today and getting less so, but we remain challenged by the 
inequalities, the impatience, and the instabilities in the international arena. 
We have learned rather well to cope with the old threat; we are still 
groping on how to cope with the new ones.
One can think of two or three such instabilities which must concern 
Western European in the future. The first is the situation in Eastern Eu­
rope. Of course we do see political reforms there, and that is both excit­
ing and welcome. But they are occurring against a background of eco­
nomic difficulties and the revival of nationalism and ethnic tensions. The 
prospect for these countries to emerge once again as societies which can 
offer a perspective to their people is very limited. That, of course, is a 
potentially explosive situation. It is no coincidence that military action in 
Europe in the past forty years has not occurred between East and West 
but within Eastern Europe. It’s a part of the world in which things tend to 
get out of hand when there is no hope that the systems themselves can 
meet the expectations and aspirations of their publics. In the past,the So­




























































































with the help of regimes which had at their disposal repressive forces and 
a tradition of fear. Now the Soviet Union is saying to the East European 
countries, “You’re on your own. We have enough problems on our hands. 
You have to deal with these issues yourselves”. But without help from the 
rest of Europe they will scarcely be able to cope. That promises a messy 
and potentially dangerous situation for the whole continent. It will remain 
the most serious security problem for Western Europe. For one thing, a 
failure of political reform would deprive all of Europe of its best hope 
for long-term stability. For another, unrest can still lead to conflict, and 
conflict to war.
The other traditional area of international conflict around Europe is the 
Middle East -  again demonstrated by the Gulf War and its aftermath. 
There are people who believe that the present unrest will lead to a politi­
cal solution. Perhaps. But it does not take much imagination to imagine 
what will happen if once again impatience, frustrations, anger combine 
with the availability of armed forces and modem technology to make the 
Middle East an area from which war and instability could spread. And as 
countries in this region acquire their deadlier weapons plus the ability to 
deliver them by missiles of long distances, Europe cannot remain im­
mune. The third threat to stability around Western Europe lies in the de­
velopments on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The population 
of Turkey is doubling every 30-35 years, the same goes for Egypt, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The riots we have had in Tunisia and Al­
geria may just be signs of things to come. These states are less and less 
capable of containing inherent conflict. They lie moreover in the vicinity 
of a Europe of declining demographic strength and increasing wealth.
II
The central question for future conflict management is how to provide a 
horizon of hope and confidence both to Eastern Europe and to the devel­
oping countries on our periphery, so that things do not get out of control 
there. In all these cases a perspective of a viable economic future is the 
best barrier against despair. It is the only future that provides some hope 
for a way out of the manifestations of frustration and the conflicts to 
which they can lead.
We have to think of instruments to enhance stability. These will be 
more economic than military because the threat of disorder stems more 
often than not from economic disorder. Of course, it is extremely diffi­
cult to try and devise recipes for other countries. Anybody who has 
looked into the problem of development assistance knows that. But there 
are considerable expectations in Eastern Europe concerning the European 
Community. Just as the Community has been given a boost of confidence 
by the prospects of 1992, so Eastern Europe would profit immensely, in 
terms of confidence and hence, stability, from a perspective of closer as­




























































































Some have even suggested full membership for East European coun­
tries, provided they have by then adopted a genuinely democratic political 
structure and market economy. However, there are powerful arguments 
against such a general, early enlargement of the Community. For one, 
enlargement would run against the whole notion of political union. It 
would dilute Community cohesion and virtually rule out the possibility of 
the Community assuming responsibility in the field of international order 
and security. For the Community to remain the Community after en­
largement, it must define its political identity first. If the only answer 
West Europeans can think of for preventing crisis in Eastern Europe is to 
offer those countries full membership now, this would amount to the re­
nunciation of a political union worthy of that name. And it would weaken 
the very institutions on whose strength the future stability of both West 
and Eastern Europe depends.
Futhermore, all East European countries are in a very different eco­
nomic league from the EC-countries. The transition from centrally 
planned to market economy, the recovery from economic and technologi­
cal backwardness will take decades, not years. But only once this transi­
tion is nearing completion will full membership, even in a purely eco­
nomic Community, make any sense.
Finally, admitting East European countries into the Community as full 
members would once again leave the Soviet Union outside Europe. Yet it 
is an isolated Russia that constitutes the threat for Europe, not one which 
can hope to become integrated into the international system. It would be 
foolish, therefore, to invite East European countries to join the EC with­
out having prepared the future relationship between the Community and 
the big, powerful and potentially troublesome neighbour on their Eastern 
border. Moreover, it would mean a profound weakening for the re­
formist forces within the Soviet Union which alone represent the hope for 
a modem, cooperative Russia, if a new cleavage were to open along their 
Western borders.
Hence it makes little sense to try and use full membership as a chief 
stabilizing instrument, either for the countries of Eastern Europe or for 
the Community itself. Instead, other arrangements need to be found, more 
adjusted to the conditions of East European development, more capable 
also of promising not a distant future but a medium-term perspective. 
This could consist of tariff-free access to the Community market as a 
whole. It must also involve formal association agreements, equipped with 
a wide range of institutions to manifest the new relationship; the “Euro”- 
Associations currently under negotiation between the Commission and 
major East European countries still fall short of that requirement. The 
Community has many instruments at its disposal to convey a “special re­
lationship” to Eastern Europe. There is no other national or international 
body with the same stabilizing potential as the Community. All it needs is 




























































































This is a responsibility for security in Europe. Indeed, through its very 
success as an economic community, Western Europe is now being pushed 
into a strategic responsibility. It applies to Eastern Europe today, to 
Northern Africa perhaps tomorrow. The Community, whether it likes it 
or not, is thus acquiring a major role under the new conditions of inter­
national security.
Ill
This role will also increasingly make the Community the material security 
partner for the United States, Western Europe’s traditional ally. It makes 
the EC the most promising framework wherein West European countries 
can eventually develop a common responsibility for their military defence 
as well. There can be little doubt that Nato continues to perform an im­
portant role for the security of Western Europe. It has been a remarkably 
successful organization. It is still needed to assure the coordination both 
of Western defence in Europe and of arms control negotiations and im­
plementation. But it is difficult to imagine that the organization which was 
set up to respond to what was seen as a major threat can survive un­
changed when that threat is waning. And it is equally difficult to imagine 
that an alliance structured hierarchically around the nuclear superpower 
of the United States can continue unaltered when the military attributes of 
power are being overtaken by economic and financial attributes.
So the transatlantic security partnership has to change. In essence it has 
to become less hierarchical and more co-equal. And that invariably means 
that West European states will have to take on a greater responsibility in 
defining, and providing for, military security in Europe than they have 
shouldered so far, if the Western Alliance is not to fade away.
Of course, there are many, not least in the United States and in Britain, 
as well as in the NATO bureaucracy who claim that, on the contrary, 
West European defence and security integration would undermine the 
Atlantic relationship. They are, however, wrong for two reasons. The 
first: The Atlantic framework which is currently resting on the basis of 
shared military concerns will be undermined as these concerns no longer 
dominate. Rather that holding on, come what may, to the old structure, it 
will be necessary to extend the Atlantic relationship to other, less military 
security issues - economic, ecological, financial. That, however, means 
that the Community will be the essential partner for the United States in 
such a wider framework; a stronger Community, as its founding fathers 
claimed, will strengthen, not weaken the Atlantic link.
The second reason: Even in the field of military cooperation, the tradi­
tional NATO structure will turn out to be insufficient for holding Europe 
and the United States together. America’s role as leader, initiator and 
guarantor in the Western Alliance rested on the assumption of a direct 
military threat from the Soviet Union. The threats of the future, however, 




























































































cal structure of NATO will itself become questionable. American leader­
ship will be less natural, for Americans and Europeans alike. American 
patience with the need to prepare and foster consensus among 16 sou- 
vereign nations will be more wary. In the new environment, the United 
States needs a major partner in Europe in order to remain anchored to the 
old continent. The question is, of course, what European institution can 
best serve as its partner.
Judging from official declarations, the candidate preferred officially by 
West Europe’s major countries is the old West European Union (WEU). 
It is supposed to “serve as a bridge” between NATO and the EC. Its at­
traction for its supporters lies precisely in its distinction from the Com­
munity and its inability to undermine existing NATO structures. And 
would, they temptingly suggest, it not be much better to go the WEU way 
so that the Community can get on with the job of integrating Eastern Eu­
rope or neutral states like Austria and Sweden?
But it is precisely for these supposed advantages that the WEU road to 
European defence integration is fundamentally flawed. For one, it will 
not provide for real defence integration. Whatever the WEU will coordi­
nate, are only crumbs which fall from the NATO table -  military activi­
ties in extra-European crises, a bit of Euro-Group activism to show to an 
increasingly irritated American public that “Europe is carrying a due 
share of the burden”, etc. In other words: the WEU will offer integration 
not of the central aspects of European defence, but only of the peripheral 
ones.
But even if it should be able to extend its responsibilities to areas of 
more immediate concern to West Europeans, the political argument 
against the WEU option is even more important. For by refusing the EC 
any real responsibility in matters of security and defence, the community 
is being emasculated politically. A Political Union which leaves out the 
last vestige of national souvereignty, namely “national” defence, is like a 
house with a hole in the roof, open to the destructive impact of fowl 
weather. And the supposed advantage that a non-defence EC could more 
easily integrate new, non-NATO members is, in truth, the argument for a 
community without a clear political identity and without close political 
cohesion. For those who are serious about the Community becoming a 
Political Union, there can only be one answer to the question where Eu­
ropeans should organize their common defence and formulate their rela­
tionship to the United States -  within the Community.
Only a few years, even months ago, the thought that this might be the 
framework for West European defence coordination would have seemed 
outlandish. But now, the Community has acquired a strategic role in the 
non-military security of Europe through its potential for promoting sta­
bility in Eastern Europe, and the need to put the transatlantic relationship 
on a new basis has become manifest. As a result, the Community has be­
come the natural framework for Western Europe to define and implement 




























































































Of course, there will have to be a long period of transition before 
Western Europe becomes a Security Community and a new transatlantic 
contract is in place to maintain the close link with the United States. The 
assumption of military responsibilities from Nato institutions will have to 
be gradual, the learning period protracted.
There could be two complementary avenues to that objective. One 
would be the avenue of arms control, the other of more coordinated de­
fence planning. We are entering a decade in which our ability to super­
vise, to inspect, to monitor military arms control moves in Europe is be­
coming particularly important. There is a strong case for West Europeans 
to set up a European arms control agency to deal with the monitoring of 
arms control agreements. This would have a profound effect on West Eu­
ropean cooperation. Once you devise a satellite you have to define its 
tasks. Once it is in orbit, you have to devise ways of elaborating, of inter­
preting the data it provides. Arms control and military intelligence will 
have to be coordinated in a different way than before: a satellite in space 
has profound consequences here on earth. West Europeans would have to 
think more cohesively about arms control as well as defence.
The other avenue is a European Defence Planning Agency. Western 
Europe needs an instrumental incentive for its members states to start 
thinking about military security together. This could be a West European 
Defence System, modelled along the lines of the European Monetary Sys­
tem: It would consist of an arrangement by which countries that want to 
participate register their armed forces with a common command author­
ity which would look after common training, common equipment re­
quirements, the education of officers and N.C.O.s etc. This would, in it­
self, not undercut the responsibility of existing NATO institutions but 
complement them. And over time it would enable European governments 
to develop a common security policy and a common defence. Military 
forces in Western Europe could become more integrated, just like the Eu­
ropean Monetary System has brought currencies closer together. There 
could be a European coordinating body under a joint commander, re­
sponsible for developing joint methods of training, military education, 
force requirements, etc., for those countries who are willing to work 
within the new arrangement. European defence cooperation, in contrast to 
the failure of all attempts employed in the past, would be from the top 
down, not isolated or floating around at the bottom.
Clearly this would not be welcomed by all members of NATO, and not 
all EC members of NATO need to take part at the outset. But once it can 
be shown that as a result of their cooperation a lot of other things will be 
improved -  Europe’s political weight and responsibility, but also the stan­
dardization of equipment, joint procurement, joint exercises by military 
forces, etc. -  a convincing case will emerge that, far form weakening 
transatlantic relations, European defence integration will strengthen them.
The ground may already be better prepared for such an initiative than 




























































































contrast to its predecessors, has repeatedly indicated its willingness to ac­
cept the European Community as a partner in the evolving Atlantic rela­
tionship. In addition, the unification of Germany will force Nato to think 
more imaginatively about military integration than before. To date, that 
integration was primarily realized on Germany territory, only German 
forces were not just earmarked but also assigned to the Nato command. 
Now that integration will have to be practiced through widening and 
deepening, both in the level of military integration (down to divisions or 
even brigades) and in the regional spread (not only in Germany but else­
where in Western Europe as well). A European Defence Planning Agency 
within the Community framework would also build a bridge over which 
French forces could find the way back into a firmer collective defence ar­
rangement.
IV
The main theme of this paper is that West European governments have to 
recognize the responsibilities that the weight and potential of the Euro­
pean Community bestow on them for the sake of international order. Un­
derlying this view is a particular way of looking at the Community, and it 
may be appropriate to spell this out in conclusion.
Among those favouring an increasing role of the European Commu­
nity, there are essentially two schools of thought. The first argues that the 
main contribution the Community can make is that it puts the relationship 
among its members on a qualitatively new footing: not the Darwinist rules 
of international law should henceforth apply, giving power to the mighty 
and imposing subservience on the weak, but the new rules of suprana- 
tionality which create a set of institutions and regulations that spread 
power, impose interdependence, and thus produce peace. In essence, the 
main contribution of the Community lies in the fact that the condition of 
state relations inside the Community is profoundly changed.
The other school of thought, while recognizing the value of this new 
internal relationship, is concerned with the international conditions in 
which the Community, like any subject of international law, has to oper­
ate. It looks at the Community’s role in the world, at its contribution to 
international stability, order and peace; to have created a new internal 
structure of state relations is, for this school of thought, not sufficient.
The first school has powerful spokesmen, among them, it seems, even 
Jean Monnet himself. He saw the Community as an example rather than a 
power, a way of being rather than a way of doing. Today, when East Eu­
ropean countries are beckoning to be invited for ultimate membership, 
this view is gaining ground among those who, above all, are concerned 
with ending Europe’s post-war division.
The arguments put forward in this paper, however, only make sense if 
there is more to the Community, in particular if it is willing to play a role 




























































































the international environment in which it operates and on which it de­
pends. Hence the rejection of premature enlargement of the Community 
since this would dilute its ability to act as a power; hence the insistence 
that the Community accept its responsibility in Eastern Europe and else­
where as a prime contribution to international order; hence the argument 
that the Community should gradually include among its tasks also that of 
military defence.
Clearly, the second school is more ambitious than the first. Perhaps it is 
also more traditional in that it believes in a conflictual world in which 
interests and power are the currency of influence and competition. Yet 
that ambition is warranted indeed. For rich Western Europe merely to 
concentrate on itself, to bask in the good feeling of setting an example, is 
sufficient only for those who have experienced the great European wars 
of this century: their main objective is, understandably, to prevent any 
repetition. But that repetition is unlikely in any case thanks to the nuclear 
peace. The real challenge today lies not in overcoming the problems of 
the past but in addressing those of the future. And here the Community, 
by its sheer existence and weight, has a responsibility which it can assume 
or which it can fail.
Failure, however, will be more costly than those who see the prime 
function of the Community in setting an example are willing to admit: the 
very cohesion of the Community would be at risk. Securing the environ­
ment in which the Community can prosper is, I believe, a great prize, 
worthy of the idealism of its citizens and the statesmanship of its politi­
cians. It may also determine in the end the success or failure of the 1992 
adventure, thus bridging the cleavage between the two schools of thought. 
Without a political rationale which goes beyond mere prosperity for the 
members, Europe will not succeed in becoming a political unit of any 
consequence, capable both of looking after its economy and looking after 
its security.
In order to endure, the Community has to make a difference in the 
world. It will not do that through economic and monetary union, still the 
prime candidate for the run-of-the-mill Eurocrats for pushing the Twelve 
to political union. What is now required, particularly at this juncture of 
change in the East and uncertainty in the centre of Europe, is an unam­
biguous political signal: that the Twelve intend to be reckoned with on the 
international scene. Nothing could send this message more clearly than the 
recognition that the Community is a Community for security, and first 
steps of European defence integration to underline that recognition.
The crisis of Eastern Europe and the growing need to redefine the 
transatlantic relationship give to West European governments a unique 
chance to show what they are about: not just a bunch of inward-looking 
prosperous states, but a group capable and willing to promote interna­
tional order and shoulder the costs that go with it. If they miss that 




























































































experiment that is the Community will itself be at risk of becoming a 
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